



CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Strategy Essay
Competition

Essays
1999

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
This volume is dedicated to

Colonel John J. Madigan III, USA (Ret.)
1936-1999

*the editor of Parameters
who served as a judge for six years in the
CJCS Strategy Essay Competition.
A soldier, scholar, colleague, and friend,
he never lost his enthusiasm for new ideas.*

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The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition

The National Defense University (NDU) has conducted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition since 1982. Through this competition students at professional military education institutions are challenged to write original essays about significant aspects of national security strategy. The competition rewards the best contributions with prizes presented through the generosity of the NDU Foundation together with the opportunity for subsequent publication by NDU Press.

Essays by students enrolled in either senior or intermediate service colleges as well as in the constituent colleges of NDU (the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, and Armed Forces Staff College) are eligible. Essays must be the author's own work and be completed during the academic year. Intermediate college entries are submitted through the respective senior college and count as part of that college's quota.

Competitors may write on any dimension of national security strategy—the political, economic, industrial, psychological, and military instruments of national power as used in war and peace to achieve strategic objectives. Essays with a joint emphasis, including historical contributions, are encouraged.

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The Revolution in Media Affairs: Reinventing U.S. Strategic Communications in the Era of Slobodan Milosevic

CONNIE L. STEPHENS

If a single drama raised the curtain on what military modernizers call the revolution in military affairs (RMA), it was the war theater of *Desert Storm*. CNN transmitted nightly fireworks from bombs dropped just on target, and the world marveled at the apparently instant outcome of information age combat. Optimists argued that by equipping troops to gain “information superiority” from the growing synergy of orbital satellites and digital technology, America and its allies would quickly resolve the coming century’s conflicts. A decade later, the contest over Kosovo has tempered post-Gulf War optimism with renewed attention to the roles that other national institutions—political,

Connie L. Stephens won first place in the 1999 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition with this entry, written while attending the National War College. Dr. Stephens is a foreign service information officer who has held several positions in the International Broadcasting Bureau, Voice of America/Worldnet Television. She holds a doctorate in African languages and literature from the University of Wisconsin.

economic, and sociocultural—play in winning wars. An air campaign intended to deter Serbs from attacking ethnic Albanians, but portrayed on local media as unprovoked aggression on Serb civilians, seems to have solidified support for the architects of ethnic cleansing.

In this light, the NATO battle with Serbia may focus the American public and policymaking community on the national security implications of a second digital transformation—the global *revolution in media affairs*. The U.S. private sector proudly leads this revolution, reaping profits as *Dallas* and *Baywatch* become worldwide hits and dispatching reporters with satellite phones to wherever a story unfolds. Emerging from the Cold War, the West's international shortwave broadcasters find that satellite feeds also create new options by permitting long-distance partnerships with proliferating local FM and TV stations. However, authoritarian regimes can thwart this maneuver, as Slobodan Milosevic demonstrated in the runup to Yugoslavia's war with NATO.

In October 1998, NATO commander General Wesley Clark visited Serbia in the wake of a pledge that President Milosevic made to Richard Holbrooke the previous week. On October 20, as Clark warned Belgrade's leaders to fulfill their promise to withdraw military forces from Kosovo or face the possibility of NATO airstrikes,¹ the Serb Parliament passed a draconian "Public Information Law." The new legislation imposed fines large enough to bankrupt any publication or broadcaster found guilty of "offending the dignity and reputation of a person" or of publishing "untruths." It also prohibited local broadcasters from the common practice of rebroadcasting foreign programs, in effect removing Serb-language radio and television programs produced by the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe

(RFE), and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) from local airwaves.² And while Yugoslav troops and tanks withdrew across the Serb border to permit a temporary Kosovo Verification Mission from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Milosevic consolidated one of the most powerful weapons of previous nationalist Yugoslav wars—state-controlled monopoly media.

The Serb leader's cynical move to prepare his country's media environment for war, as he bought time to plan a new ethnic cleansing campaign, is clear in hindsight. Less obvious, but critical to America's future national security posture, is how for over a decade the media policies of President Milosevic exacerbated ethnic tensions and created the climate for violence. In making an argument that U.S. national interests require a new mandate for U.S. strategic communications—defined here as government-sponsored international broadcasting and new (Internet) media, and the use of media by American diplomats and policymakers—this essay pays particular attention to the example of Serbia and its neighbors. It also explores how a revolution has transformed the global media environment, proposes a set of operational concepts as guidelines for U.S. international communicators, and outlines a handful of initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. communications with overseas audiences.

Mass Media and Ethnic Conflict

Mark Thompson presents a detailed study of how ultranationalist leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Franjo Tudjman skillfully exploited the potent Communist legacy of state-controlled media—especially monopoly television—to orchestrate violence and shatter Yugoslavia.³ Where Communist

broadcasts once condemned “class enemies” and “capitalism,” successor propaganda machines stigmatized neighboring ethnic groups with inflammatory terms like “Serb terrorists,” “Ustashe hordes,” and “Muslim fanatics.”⁴ The demonized groups were incessantly accused of crimes, past and present, real and imagined. Films portraying the partisan heroes and savaged victims of battles from the Middle Ages to World War II were constantly replayed, making implicit comparisons with today’s armies battling for greater Serbia or greater Croatia.

In addition to popularizing ethnic insults and reinforcing historical grievances, the region’s authoritarian regimes also use television to stage events and distort facts. The famous 1987 speech in Pristina—when Slobodan Milosevic forged his political identity as an uncompromising Serb nationalist by bellowing to an enraged Serb crowd, “No one shall beat you again!”—was played and replayed on nationwide TV, coining a modern Serb rallying call.⁵ Both the event and the one-sided reporting were carefully orchestrated. TV Belgrade had installed a tough nationalist correspondent in Kosovo’s capital, rather than relying on TV Pristina’s customary coverage. Local Serb activists then stationed a truck of stones nearby, to use in pelting the police.⁶ The nationwide network was thus positioned to publicize only the police pushing the demonstrators, not the crowd provoking them with rocks.⁷

A decade later, President Milosevic lost no time mounting a propaganda war as the promised NATO air campaign unfolded. His politically powerful wife, Mirjana Markovic, explained to an American visitor that her nation was simultaneously engaged in two wars: a bombing war and a media war,⁸ adding that her husband would be well advised to become more engaged in the media fight. The government quickly crushed Serbia’s few

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remaining independent media outlets. Belgrade's renowned FM radio station, B-92, was first taken off the air and then severed from the Internet.⁹ Print journalists were ordered to submit reports to government censors before publication; a prominent publisher who refused was assassinated.¹⁰ With competing messages suppressed, Serbian TV news was virtually unchallenged in its assertion that the main aim of criminal NATO attacks was to harm civilians.¹¹ No images of mass Albanian refugees were aired, and the Kosovo humanitarian disaster was described only as "made up" or "overemphasized" by Western propaganda. NATO opponents were described as fascists, dictators, killers, death disseminators, criminals, gangsters, bandits, barbarians, perverts, lunatics, scum, trash, vandals, and vampires.¹²

Building on its success manipulating national mass media, the Serbian Ministry of Information set its sights on international audiences, turning in particular to the world's increasing Internet traffic. Its official web site, www.serbia-info.com, was largely in English. Each day of the conflict, stories were posted for the international journalists, policymakers, and wider publics who seek news from the information highway. The site repeated the same messages delivered to Serb TV audiences: NATO aggressors were intentionally and unjustly targeting Yugoslav civilians; Serb military measures in Kosovo were solely designed to deter Albanian terrorists; NATO policymakers were fumbling and fractious; and Russia was a strong ally of Yugoslavia. The web stories had titles like "NATO aircraft continue shooting at civilian targets all over Serbia," and "Albanian terrorism after Milosevic-Holbrooke accord." Sections on international reaction quoted widely from the Western press—"The Washington Post: NATO Frustrated Due to a Fiasco" or "New York Times: Clinton

Road to Hell.”¹³ Serbia’s home page linked the popular bull’s eye image, symbolizing resistance to NATO, to another page called, “These are NATO targets,” a photo essay of newborn babies, elderly dead, schools, factories, and other nonmilitary enterprises harmed in the bombing.¹⁴

The conflict over Kosovo is only one facet of much wider regional instability. Serbia’s neighbors face similar challenges, stemming from exceptionally powerful state media that support nationalist leaders and attack their perceived enemies. Next door, in Bosnia’s second entity, the Republika Srpska, the hard-line Serb SRT TV channel became so inflammatory that the UN Office of the High Commissioner intervened in 1997 to insert an international administrator.¹⁵ The Tudjman government of Croatia frequently harasses independent journalists with legal prosecution. In 1998, some 900 journalists were charged, often with criminal offenses, under Croatia’s 1992 Law on Public Information.

Transforming Media Affairs

The severe media laws and polarizing messages common to official Serb and Croat media echo Communist-era journalism. Yet these governments also exploit sophisticated video techniques to communicate with television viewers and mount multilingual web sites to attract and inform, if not always persuade, Internet consumers. They enter the 21st century as practitioners of what might be described as a media revolution, to borrow from the thinking of military analyst Andrew Krepinevich. Paraphrasing his frequently cited definition of a military revolution, a revolution in media affairs occurs when the application of new technologies to a significant number of media production and distribution systems combines with innovative formats and new

types of media organizations to alter fundamentally the character and conduct of mass communications.¹⁶ Because authoritarian regimes in Serbia and elsewhere find mass media such an effective tool for maintaining power and fostering ethnic nationalism, and because U.S. national interests are served when government-funded media fill gaps left by private media in communicating U.S. values and policies overseas, it is useful to explore the character of the ongoing media transformation in some detail.

The Krepinevich framework proposes that a combination of four elements produces a genuine RMA: technological change, systems development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation.¹⁷ Combining to produce the media version of a “system of systems,” these equate to innovations like geostationary and low-earth-orbit satellites (GEOS and LEOs) and portable video uplinks; Internet news and the upcoming “Internet in the Sky”; talk radio, niche programming, and multichannel cable networks; and myriad FM radio outlets, global and regional satellite TV networks, and mammoth media conglomerates. Another expert on revolution in warfare, Eliot Cohen, helps define the sea change underway in the character and conduct of mass communication:

- The appearance of media is being transformed.
- The structure of media organizations is changing.
- New media elites are emerging.
- New media formats and organizations are altering national power positions.¹⁸

Transforming the Appearance of Media

Since the close of the Cold War, digital technology, affordable equipment, and liberalized regulatory policies have collectively

altered both the quality and quantity of mass media. Slick production values like stereo FM and flashy video graphics are virtually universal. FM radio stations mushroom from Bosnia to Benin and migrate to the Internet from Belgrade. Urban audiences with access to a range of FM stations are increasingly disinclined to listen to relatively low-quality shortwave transmissions. Call-in shows and e-mail make interactive programming de rigueur: President Clinton hosts talk radio in Shanghai; disc jockeys announce e-mail song requests in Nairobi. Multimedia web sites forge an entirely new format from the fusion of text, photos, and streaming audio and video, with archived material accessed by search engines. The multiplication of media formats drastically sharpens competition for foreign broadcast audiences.

New digitized ways to organize program distribution render time and distance less relevant to media consumers. Direct-to-home (DTH) satellite services have enough channel options to replay a program at multiple times. If an early evening "pay-per-view" film is inconvenient, there's another showing a few hours later. If a live play of a radio show is missed or the address is outside the transmitter footprint, a RealAudio rendition can be found on the web.

A key aspect of changing broadcast formats is the increasing number of niche radio and TV channels "narrowcasting" to restricted demographic and interest groups rather than packaging a wide range of programs in a single program stream. Cable and satellite audiences grow accustomed to all-news, all-sports, and all-comedy channels. Language and ethnic groups, including political exiles, produce, for example, a Kurdish satellite channel from London and Tamil channels from South India. CNN expands its market by creating a 24-hour Spanish channel. The

500-channel universe segregates consumers into smaller groups as it offers individuals a greater variety and volume of information options.

The Changing Structure of Media Organizations

Paradoxically, the new media environment favors both individuals and huge multinational conglomerates. Tiny "microstations" may reach only a few blocks,¹⁹ but Saudi tycoons underwrite satellite TV for viewers across the Arab world. The apparent contradiction occurs because successful programs are produced and packaged for well-defined target groups. Depending on program cost and intended audience, broadcasters aim for areas as small as a university neighborhood, or as broad as the global sweep of CNN International and BBC World television. Media conglomerates, from Time-Warner to the *Times of India*, realize economies of scale by tapping a single, digitally compatible resource base to produce multiple products. Small organizations benefit from their ability to appeal to the specific interests of a few people. Big organizations leverage huge investments into a variety of attractive products targeted wherever they detect a market. The Internet, of course, capitalizes on both these trends, with space for both idiosyncratic amateurs and mass-media professionals.

The structure of media delivery systems is also changing rapidly, thanks largely to satellite transmissions. Where erratic shortwave radio signals were once the only practical option for leaping national borders, satellites now deliver studio-quality video anywhere in the world. But with increased competition, reaching satellite TV viewers often depends on what industry insiders describe as being "in a good neighborhood." Households with individual satellite receivers seldom buy more

than a one-dish system. Even cable distributors, who downlink and feed a wide range of channels to cable subscribers, prefer to keep their dish collections to a minimum. Because a single dish usually points to a particular satellite, good neighborhoods in the sky, like those on the ground, mean that your channel sits next to other highly attractive programming. DTH subscribers or cablecasters are then likely to own a dish aimed where you live. And just as homes in neighborhoods with good services are expensive, it costs more to rent frequencies on popular DTH satellites. Signals strong enough to be downlinked by small dishes require more power than transmissions to bigger, less convenient dishes. For a program not to be isolated, like a hard-to-find house outside city limits, it helps to be located on a channel next to like-minded neighbors. In the sparse media environments where shortwave thrives, a single frequency commonly carries programs in many languages, but most modern consumers expect to find familiar material whenever they tune to their favorite channels.

Emerging New Media Elites

The current media revolution, like its military counterpart, races forward on technical progress with trained and talented people.²⁰ Some emergent media elites expert on cutting-edge technologies and systems include digital studio technicians, cable entrepreneurs, and webmasters. Others arise because they grasp the revolution's operational and organizational potential. These are the visionaries and entrepreneurs responsible for implementing the most profound innovations, from Africa's first national radio networks to the planet's first satellite Internet systems. The world's new media elite—from TV station managers and on-air talent to Internet "digerati"—are often

young, because the young adapt more easily to new technology and, outside the aging West and Japan, global audiences are increasingly youthful.

Media transformation benefits policymakers as well as celebrities who master new modes of communication. Minnesota Governor Jesse Ventura used JesseNet, a list of 3,000 e-mail subscribers, to organize much of his low-budget campaign.²¹ Nigeria's outgoing president, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, got worldwide publicity as a guest on the BBC weekly webcast talk show.²² U.S. foreign policy analysts who communicate effectively on air and online expand support for both their ideas and actions.

Altered National Power Positions

The media revolution is a major factor in the shift from industrial to information-based economies. Mass media also underlie what Joseph Nye calls soft power, "the ability to achieve goals through attraction rather than coercion . . . which depends largely on the persuasiveness of the free information that an actor seeks to transmit."²³ This is because radio and television, movies and magazines, and e-mail and the Internet are the most effective ways for national leaders and people to communicate their ideas, intentions, and commercial innovations to other leaders and people. Dissenters destroyed the Berlin Wall because they resented Soviet domination and repressive regimes, and they clamored to create nations based on Western models in part because mass media, including the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and European television, convinced them that Westerners live well.

The flip side of gaining power with compelling mass messages is deterring the efforts of competitors. For all its diversity, this

plethora of new media formats and program providers has not fully defeated government censors, who grow more sophisticated, permitting nonthreatening entertainment programs while restricting information likely to challenge incumbent regimes and ideologies. Profits are made, but propaganda protected. China forbids cable companies to distribute foreign satellite channels directly; India bars independent radio from producing live news or using nongovernment transmitters; and virtually no independent broadcasters are licensed in the Middle East. Citizens in these nations are often the very publics with whom the American would like to communicate. Understanding today's international and regional media markets is the first prerequisite.

Altered Conduct of Communication

Like radical military shifts, media revolutions create new strategic contexts. Armies and navies re-equipped, re-organized, and re-trained to exploit revolutions in artillery, sail and shot, and land warfare. Similarly, the concept of mass media was reinvented to pursue the possibilities of the printing press, radio, and television. Just as the essential Clausewitzean definition of war—an act of force "to compel our enemy to do our will"²⁴—remains constant despite technological transformations, the essence of media as a means of communication to share information and persuade target audiences is unchanged. However, the integration of digital technology across telecommunications and information systems used by new kinds of organizations fundamentally alters the character and conduct of mass media. One important difference is that audiences everywhere—not just in the media-surfeited West—are shifting from an era of information scarcity to one of information overload. They have more media choices but only limited time and attention. In

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addition, the ability to shape and send messages is increasingly decentralized. This decentralization is related to what may be the most intriguing shift in media: mass communication, like individual conversations, is increasingly interactive, blurring the role of sender and receiver. Modern media consumers demand information tailored to their specific needs, and they seek to play an active role in the communication process. This is the new battlefield on which media producers compete. What principles guide the new winners?

Facing a military battlespace reshaped by the digital RMA, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili responded with a set of operational concepts laid out in the self-described “conceptual template,” *Joint Vision 2010*. National security strategists who focus on America’s need to communicate values and policies with rapidly changing international audiences would be wise to formulate the mass media equivalents of the *JV 2010* “dominant maneuver” and “precision engagement.” The corresponding templates might include such concepts as *credible content, compelling context, competitive quality, ready accessibility, and interactivity*.

Goals like credible content and ready accessibility are long-standing objectives of expert communicators. However, just as the pinpoint accuracy of precision-guided weapons redefines the phrase “precision engagement,” the impact of new media systems redefines traditional media concepts. Another similarity between the cluster of military concepts outlined in *JV 2010* and media counterparts is that they overlap. Precision engagement facilitates dominant maneuver, and both are increased by the standoff capability of laser-guided weapons. Similarly, credible content, compelling context, and competitive quality are mutually

reinforcing. Moreover, the interplay of digital circuits, satellite feeds, and niche broadcasters helps redefine all three factors.

This very complexity, stemming from modern media's "system of systems," is precisely why U.S. strategic communication needs reinventing. Incremental change suits bureaucracies in gradually evolving environments. Radical restructuring is required for a media world where, for example, a Ugandan broadcast colleague asked that e-mail be used because, he explained, communicating from Kampala was so much cheaper by Internet than by phone or even fax. How then does the media revolution redefine operational concepts for successful international mass communication?

Credible Content

U.S. strategic communications must ring true in order to attract and convince international audiences. Credibility is established incrementally over time, not instantly in the midst of a crisis or conflict—for example, CNN viewers multiply when big stories break, thanks to the network's slowly established track record. Believable content is not just a matter of *fact*. The messenger's trustworthiness, the resonance of surrounding messages, and the external context can influence a media consumer more than specific facts. Recall the *Washington Post* reporter in Belgrade who discovered that local TV viewers dismissed CNN and Sky TV images of refugees streaming from Kosovo as equivalent to propaganda on their own national TV network.²⁵

Compelling Context

U.S. strategic communications must communicate through contexts that enhance the credibility and accessibility of information. It is easy for cross-cultural messages to be distorted

between sender and receiver. Choosing culturally popular formats and credible media partners creates a context of common interests, making messages more persuasive. Entertainment, not just news programs, conveys important information.

Competitive Quality

U.S. strategic communications must keep pace with rapid international innovations in program quality. Substance counts, but state-of-the-art production values make messages more attractive. Highly variable media environments determine what is competitive in a local market, from shortwave radio in Ethiopia to stereo FM in Estonia. Competitiveness in new media often stems from combining familiar media forms—print, photos, graphics, audio, and video—in new ways, and from adopting standardized Internet formats as quickly as they evolve.

Ready Accessibility

U.S. strategic communications must be easy to find. With greater media choice, convenience counts. Consumers gravitate to favorite media “neighborhoods,” whether these are local FM and TV channels, a popular TV satellite service, a preferred cable company, or a popular Internet gateway site.

Interactivity

U.S. strategic communications have the opportunity to engage with international audiences in new ways. The use of mass media is evolving from passive consumption toward active engagement. The ability to phone a talk-show host, send e-mail to a journalist, or personalize a web site lends individual and local perspectives to mass communication, even when sender and receiver live far

apart. Media consumers become invested in messages that they help shape.

Strategic Communication Initiatives

Operational concepts are most useful when they help policymakers generate and prioritize concrete activities. In response to the principles just outlined, new media initiatives should include television, Internet, and FM radio and increased media activities by U.S. diplomats and policymakers. Each endeavor should be designed to exploit the synergies of credible content, compelling context, competitive quality, ready accessibility, and interactivity, as defined by a specific target audience. As an effort to adjust America's public information strategy to the aftermath of the media revolution, the following projects hold promise to better communicate American values and policies with important overseas audiences.

Television

Television is an especially potent medium because its fusion of sound and moving images creates a sense of reality that viewers perceive as highly credible, especially about aspects of life they experience only through media.²⁶ U.S. Government-sponsored international broadcasting needs a clear mandate and enhanced resources to produce and distribute foreign language television for key strategic markets. The issue is urgent because TV is the medium of choice for many rural dwellers and virtually all urban residents in a world that is rapidly migrating to cities. Cable TV is carpeting China, reaching some 88 percent of urban households.²⁷ In spite of Saudi Arabia's ban on satellite dishes, 64 percent of the population watches satellite TV, and 45 percent has individual household dishes.²⁸ Nine out of ten Croatians say

that the national television network is their chief source of news.²⁹ Scores of local-language satellite channels beam into India and Pakistan.

U.S. international broadcasters make modest efforts to participate in this TV explosion, but vast opportunities remain untapped. The U.S. Information Agency's WORLDNET Television, which helped pioneer the interactive possibilities of satellite television in the 1980s, originates many *Dialogue* programs where international journalists query American experts and policymakers. But the video is only one way, and the programs seldom receive regularly scheduled slots on overseas stations. U.S. international radio broadcasters, which include VOA, RFE, Radio Liberty (RL), Radio Marti, and Radio Free Asia (RFA), remain rooted in a proud tradition of piercing the Iron Curtain with shortwave radio, although several VOA language services, including Mandarin, Serbian, Croatian, and Farsi, produce radio-television simulcasts, a relatively low-tech hybrid of the two media.

The radio broadcasters and WORLDNET TV are understandably cautious about treading on the territory of US commercial TV broadcasters. However, profitable markets are by no means a perfect overlap with public information imperatives. CNN has a global English service but is not among the top 10 satellite services regularly watched in the Persian Gulf, where Arabic channels are preferred.³⁰ No Arabic TV broadcaster is based in the United States.

Television is relatively more expensive to produce than radio, so fewer languages would be candidates for major government-sponsored television initiatives. Key regional languages—Mandarin, Arabic, Russian, and Hindi—are logical candidates. Less widely spoken languages in areas where the United States

has unusually strong interests are also likely candidates. The subregion in Southeast Europe that encompasses Serbia and its neighbors is an obvious choice and is illustrative in describing how a major new television project might be tailored to a specific media context.

The time is ripe to consider a regional satellite channel in the dialects that were collectively described in Tito's day as Serbo-Croatian. Although the government censors terrestrially transmitted television, about 12 percent of Serbians and 18 percent of Croatians have access to satellite television.³¹ Similarly, there are reports that up to 15 percent of Bosnians had dishes, often locally manufactured, before the recent war.³² In addition to being downlinked by dish-owning households, the DTH channel could be fed through cable systems and selectively rebroadcast by conventional terrestrial stations where this is permitted. The half-hour VOA Serbian and Croatian radio-TV simulcasts are available on satellite, but they are not part of a round-the-clock program stream and are thus surrounded by other locally targeted material to attract viewers to their broadcast neighborhood. The production values of the current programs are rigorously modest and should be upgraded to a competitive level for the local market (a former Bosnian television station manager joked that colleagues describe the format as "newspaper on television").

In addition to the subregion's political turmoil and troubled media history, another reason to support a full DTH channel is the extensive investment the United States and European Union already make in local independent broadcasters. In tandem with their military commitments to combat ethnic cleansing, NATO countries believe that civil society underpins nations based on citizenship, rather than on ethnic identity. Private-sector media

contribute to civil society by holding governments to account, expressing diverse views, and generating a local media industry. This is why donors fund journalism training and offer other kinds of support to emerging media throughout the former Yugoslavia. A multidonor coalition could channel much of the funding allocated for media projects into local program production for use on a satellite channel. Monies would also be needed to lease a frequency on an already popular DTH satellite.³³ A multiethnic regional production center could be established, possibly staffed by some of the journalists who have received long-term training in the West.

Apart from being available on a locally popular satellite, program quality would be the most important factor determining the success of such a regional channel, since it would compete with both local and international television. In addition to spreading costs, multidonor underwriting could lessen the likelihood of producing the often boring fare of official media. Ideally, the channel should create a brand identity closely associated with the viewers and issues of the subregion. Soap operas might handle sensitive subjects like refugee resettlement. Animated satire, well known in this part of the world, is another possible format for dealing with controversy. If all parties were fair game, a cartoon version of *Saturday Night Live* could well prove popular across national boundaries. Call-in programs, game shows, and programming for children and teenagers are just a few of the many possibilities.

One reservation sometimes voiced about a multi-ethnic media endeavor is also one of the best reasons to contemplate the project: regional broadcasters, including Bosnia's independent outlets, increasingly insist on programs produced in distinct Bosniak, Croatian, or Serbian dialects of what remains a mutually

intelligible language. This form of political correctness segregates local audiences. Although satellite viewers could still select individual programs from a regional channel, local broadcasters would not make the choice preemptively as they do now. If programs, some of them featuring multi-ethnic hosts and casts, are sufficiently attractive, they are likely to draw a diverse audience, exposing them to ethnically integrated perspectives.

If a donor coalition concurs that foreign assistance to independent media is a logical element of a regional communications strategy—and should extend to underwriting programs for a regional satellite channel—it should remember that sustainable media endeavors must be viable businesses. International media expert Gene Mater of The Freedom Forum offers an important critique of Western aid when he notes that it focuses almost entirely on program content, not on media-related business skills. Even award-winning organizations like Belgrade's B-92 FM and a Sarajevo's newspaper, *Oslobodjenje*, must learn to price and sell advertising, or they will collapse without outside assistance.³⁴ Funding for TV program production should carry requirements that recipients have viable business plans and provide technical assistance to design and implement such plans.

A final concern about DTH television is that it could be jammed. Although it is technically possible to interfere with a satellite broadcast by uplinking on its transmission frequency,³⁵ the practice specifically violates Article 35 of the International Telecommunication Convention. This treaty provision specifies that space radio telecommunications must not cause harmful interference with the radio services or communications of others.³⁶ A country willing to be labeled a rogue state might ignore its U.N. obligations to the International Telecommuni-

cations Union, but ITU could presumably respond by sanctioning the perpetrator's access to telecommunications from space. While not impossible, jamming (co-channel interference) seems likely to remain extremely rare.

Internet

If television is today's dominant mass media, the Internet is tomorrow's. Some computer "hosts" will be wired to the web by satellite and others by fiber-optic cable, but one way or another, opinion makers will be connected. Over 43 million hosts, stretched across 214 countries and territories, are already linked to the Net, with 100 million expected in 2001.³⁷ Nearly as many urban Chinese own a computer (10 percent) as regularly listen to the radio (11 percent). The number use the Internet users (3.5 percent) is double that of major international radio programs listeners.³⁸ Observers concerned that such statistics come from cities, not the countryside, should recall that Teledesic Network, which promotes itself as a "global, broadband "Internet-in-the-Sky," expects to have a network of 288 low-earth-orbiting satellites in place by 2004.³⁹ This project and a handful of competitors will create two-way connectivity independent of land-based phone and cable systems. Successfully implemented, the plans would make broadband Internet services as accessible from the sands of Namibia as from the sidewalks of New York.

Serbia's conclusion in 1999 that it needed an English web site to battle NATO is reminiscent of American's decision in 1942 that it needed German shortwave broadcasts to support its World War II campaign. U.S. international broadcasters have begun to tap the possibilities of the Internet to communicate with Serbs and Russians and Asians,⁴⁰ but a significantly larger investment holds the promise of significantly larger success. The BBC World

Service web site, developed by this reigning peer competitor of all international broadcasters, suggests the unique possibilities opened by this still-emerging media form.⁴¹ Print, photos, audio and video clips, and a variety of live and archived broadcasts are intermixed, conveniently organized by news event and program category, from headline news stories to sports and English-teaching. Page formats are consistent and attractive throughout the site. Links from the World Service home page to other BBC web pages change often, depending on news events. (In the midst of the Kosovo crisis, Balkan language links were prominently displayed, including a joint Red Cross-BBC Albanian project to unite Kosovo refugees through radio or Internet broadcasts.) A web surfer can instantly connect to any one of 43 language services.

BBC webmasters and programmers make special efforts to exploit the interactive possibilities of Internet media. Site users are invited to e-mail their opinions on subjects discussed in the weekly *Talking Point ON AIR* program and to vote their views. Their comments, along with those of debating policymakers, are posted following the program. The live call-in show is broadcast over radio and simultaneously webcast in both audio and video versions. A search engine combs archived BBC texts by headline or word by word. Internet links to related web sites are conveniently posted, with the caveat that BBC is not responsible for the content of external sites from NATO, the Kosovar News Agency, and the Serbian Ministry of Information, which are on a list related to the Kosovo conflict.⁴²

Although commercial U.S. media have similar web sites, government-sponsored international broadcasters have yet to exploit the multimedia and interactive potential of the Internet for non-English-speaking audiences. Establishing a multilingual

news site so reliably credible, frequently updated, and attractively presented that international "netizens" want to bookmark it for their browsers would extend U.S. information to an important and growing community.

In addition to reaching individual users, a competitive news web site attracts foreign journalists. Further, the Internet is gradually replacing the function of newswires, demonstrated when the news editor of *Radio Dunyaa*, a popular radio channel in Dakar, Senegal, proudly showed how he downloads and distributes news reports from web sites like CNN and the French TV 5. The station owner is delighted with the new system because it allowed him to cancel all wire subscriptions.

FM Radio

With large parts of their shortwave audience migrating to local FM, VOA and RFE/RL responded by recruiting over 1,000 FM affiliate stations to rebroadcast satellite transmissions of their programs on local airwaves. This process of providing programs to local affiliates is known as broadcast placement.⁴³ This is an especially welcome arrangement for start-up FM stations facing the relatively high cost of news production. Placement is especially effective in increasing audience size in places like Tanzania, where only 19 percent of the population regularly watch television, but 87 percent are habitual radio listeners. Between 1995 and 1998, VOA increased its regular listenership in Tanzania from 3 percent in 1995, to 16 percent in 1998, in part because of a successful affiliation with a local FM network.⁴⁴

Such partnerships thrive in many broadcast markets, but placement remains dependent upon local stations as gatekeepers. Most affiliates are commercial stations and must balance the generally higher profits of entertainment against news and

information programs, especially during prime time. And viable affiliates are sometimes difficult to find or barred from rebroadcasting by government regulation. These reasons prompted both the BBC and Radio France International (RFI) to aggressively pursue 24-hour FM licenses in important cities such as Abidjan, Ivory Coast, where, in 1992, before FM licenses were available, RFI, BBC, and VOA earned 37, 22, and 13 percent audience shares, respectively. In May 1998, with RFI and BBC 24-hour FM relays in place, and no VOA affiliate available, regular audience size leapt to 47 percent each for RFI and BBC and slipped to less than 2 percent for VOA.⁴⁵ VOA is now pursuing an FM license in Abidjan, but the case underlines the wisdom of funding 24-hour rebroadcasting arrangements in key radio markets. The cost varies by market, but for much of Africa, where radio remains king, annual license fees run in the tens of thousands of dollars.

Policymakers in the Media

A final suggestion is to improve the media skills of all international agencies and policymakers. Modern politicians know that the television age requires television skills; modern leaders whose mission includes persuading public opinion in international arenas have similar needs. They and their staffs should routinely conduct coordinated media campaigns for specific audiences, selecting whatever forms of media the target group finds most credible, compelling, accessible, and often interactive. The trend toward two-way media exchanges suggests they should appear more often in interactive formats, from press conferences to radio and TV call-ins, to online chat forums. Policymakers, especially those with foreign language skills, should appear frequently in foreign language media.

Turning to so-called new media, public information strategists should ensure that key statements of U.S. international policy are translated for concerned audiences and posted on appropriate web pages. Agency web masters should aggressively link their sites to related sites worldwide, making U.S. information easier to find. Investments made in compelling, informative web sites will attract those at the forefront of the revolution in media affairs, the very elites and opinion makers that U.S. policymakers often seek to persuade.

Conclusion

The winners of combat revolutions are the first to recognize and respond to new opportunities. Military revolutions profoundly change the conduct of war, argues Krepinevich, because they produce "a dramatic increase . . . in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces."⁴⁶ A revolution in media affairs similarly yields a dramatic increase in the potential to shape public opinion. Until U.S. strategic communications are redesigned to exploit the possibilities presented by new kinds of media, American national security strategists, unlike Slobodan Milosevic, are neglecting a critical opportunity of their era.

Notes

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4. Warren Zimmerman, "The Captive Mind—*Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina* by Mark Thompson," *The New York*

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6. Ibid., 37-38.
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8. Ron Hatchett, "How Long Will He Last?" *The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer*, April 30, 1999. Mr. Hatchett is the Director for the Center of International Studies at the University of St. Thomas. He had been in Yugoslavia just before appearing on the program.
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10. Michael Dobbs, "Sudden Death on Day of Resurrection: Publisher Gunned Down as Belgrade Marks Holy Day," *The Washington Post*, April 12, 1999, A1, A18.
11. This translation of a Yugoslav Serbian newscast is from MSNBC and replayed on *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio, April 12, 1999.
12. *All Things Considered*, National Public Radio, April 12, 1999. The descriptions of NATO forces cited on the radio broadcast were quoted from a report issued by the European Centre for War, Peace, and the News Media in London.
13. The headlines cited were posted on the homepage of the web site maintained by the Serbian Ministry of Information, April 14, 1999, <http://www.serbia-info.com>.
14. Serb Ministry of Information, "These are NATO Targets," April 7, 1999, <http://www.serbia-ino.com/news/1999-04/7/10600.html>.
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17. Ibid.
18. Eliot A. Cohen, "A Revolution in Warfare," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (March/April 1996): 44.

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20. Stephen Biddle dramatically illustrated this reality in his study of tank combat in the Gulf War. The skill level of U.S. tank crews, even more than their sophisticated hardware, magnified American effectiveness against Iraqi armored forces. See Mackubin Thomas Owens, "Technology, the RMA, and Future War," *Strategic Review* 26, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 68.
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26. Doris Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 2nd ed., (Washington: CQ Press, 1984), 3, 15.
27. The 88 percent figure comes from a sample done by the A. C. Nielsen polling company between May and October 1998. The sample covered 10 major Chinese cities with a total population of 45 to 46 million people.
28. Robert Goehrig, Office of Research, International Broadcasting Bureau, "Research Memorandum: International Radio and TV in the Persian Gulf: Survey Findings from Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and U.A.E.," Pan Arab Research Center, Gallup International, March 1999, 12. The sample size of 3,453 makes it accurate to within plus or minus 2 percent of the national population.
29. Department of State, Croatia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, 10.
30. Goehrig, 13-14.

31. The 12 percent figure is taken from unpublished records maintained by the Office of Research, International Broadcasting Bureau, Washington, DC. Intermedia conducted the field sampling of 2,772 adults in Serbia and Montenegro in June 1998. The Croatian figure is from the Office of Research, International Broadcasting Bureau, unpublished results of a survey done in Croatia by Intermedia in October and November, 1997. See also *Cable and Satellite Yearbook, 1999* (London: FT Media and Telecoms, 1999), which reports 400,000 dishes spread among 1.5 million TV homes.

32. Multimedia Coordinator Peter Vaselopoulos, of the International Broadcasting Bureau, recounts meeting an entrepreneur with the Elkor Company, which employed 30 people in prewar Sarajevo to manufacture satellite dishes. This manufacturer reported local dish penetration reached between 11 and 15 percent. Interview by author, March 3, 1999.

33. The cost could run about \$6 million per year for a channel on one of the most popular satellites, such as *Astra*. David Shiben, Satellite Specialist, Office of Engineering and Technical Operations, International Broadcasting Bureau, telephone interview by author, April 22, 1999, Washington.

34. Gene Mater, media consultant, *The Freedom Forum*, interview by author, April 6, 1999, Arlington, VA.

35. Shiben interview.

36. Major Jeff Rockwell, USAF, International and Operations law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General Headquarters, USAF, "Public International Space Law and Military Operations," paper prepared for a symposium, FY98 Legal Aspects of Information Operations, Air Force Judge Advocate General School, Maxwell AFB, AL, K-6.

37. Center for Next Generation Internet, NGI.ORG, Matrix Information and Directory Services, Inc., "Internet Survey Reaches 43.2 Million Internet Host Level," Biannual Strategic Note, February 17, 1999, <http://www.ngi.org/trends/TrendsPR9902.txt>.

38. A. C. Nielsen polling sample. The figure for international radio is a combination of VOA and BBC listening rates, which are 0.9 and 0.3 percent, respectively. The figure is likely to be conservative, because some listeners tune into both stations. See note 27.

39. John Keathley, Teledesic, interview by author, April 2, 1999, Washington. Teledesic LLC was founded in 1990. Principal shareholders include Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates, The Boeing Company, and cellular pioneer Craig McCaw.

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40. For example, the U.S. Information Agency established a special multimedia web site on the Kosovo crisis, including chat sessions in Serbia; RFE/RL runs a comprehensive listserve of news about the FSU, Central and Eastern Europe; and the VOA Mandarin Service similarly dispatches news updates in Mandarin via e-mail.

41. The URL for the British Broadcasting Corporation is <http://www.bbc.co.uk>.

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43. International Broadcasting Bureau, "Voice of America," <http://www.ibb.gov/ibbfact.html>. The number is conservative, because it includes only the Voice of America numbers, not those of RFE/RL. Some European stations are affiliated with both U.S. international broadcasters.

44. Kenneth R. Donow, Office of Research, International Broadcasting Bureau, "Research Memorandum: Media Use in Tanzania," February 23, 1999. The nationwide Tanzanian survey, done in tandem with the BBC, involved a national sample of 2,000 adults. Research International conducted the survey.

45. William Bell, International Broadcasting Bureau, Office of Research, interview by author, April 21, 1999. Bell cited from unpublished research done in Abidjan in May 1998 and from earlier USIA research reports completed in 1992.

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NATO,
*the United States, and Russia:
Flexible Security After
the Cold War*

MARK R. SANDERSON

On March 12, 1999, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact have made NATO enlargement possible, the Alliance's expansion has been anything but welcome to the Soviet Union's major successor state, Russia. Much to Russia's continued displeasure, further admissions are possible, and NATO is contemplating and executing operations that go beyond the Alliance's original collective defense responsibility. Russia's reaction to the new NATO strategic posture should be

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of great concern to a United States with global security interests and obligations. The United States must appreciate the origins of NATO, its original purpose, and its context; Russian post-Cold War perceptions and expectations relating to NATO; Russia's continued importance to the United States; and Russia's reaction to continued NATO presence and enlargement as well as threats and opportunities posed by this reaction.

NATO and the Cold War

A U.S. Department of State publication, *The Enlargement of NATO*, suggests that the formation of NATO in 1949 represented a realization that the United States must be permanently involved in European military security.¹ However, it is worth noting that states have historically banded together in the face of a hostile hegemonic power,² and circumstances after the Second World War suggest that the formation of NATO fits the traditional model, at least for the United States.³ That war left the European states self-consciously weak and fearful of an expansionist USSR. Doubtful of their ability to provide security, Britain, France, and the Benelux states persuaded the United States to enter the North Atlantic Treaty.⁴ The British viewed a U.S. security obligation necessary to allow West European integration and held that the United States itself should be part of a "broader Western Union."⁵ Entering the treaty certainly ran counter to traditional American isolationism, and U.S. assumptions regarding its long-term interest in the Alliance were not quite in tune with European expectations. U.S. policymakers viewed European integration as contributing to Soviet containment and promising an eventual minimization of transatlantic security commitments:

NATO, the United States, and Russia

If the West Europeans could be made to feel “safe,” economic prosperity, followed by political stability and eventual unity, would be assured. It would be only a matter of time before the United States could reduce its commitments; by then West Europeans would be able to stand on their own. Without this optimistic perception, it is doubtful whether the United States would ever have signed the North Atlantic Treaty . . . NATO was seen as a holding measure.⁶

Thus, from the U.S. perspective, the collective NATO defense function was indirect. Permanent European security would eventually be provided by a united Europe confident enough to withstand Soviet power and dogma; NATO was a security provider.⁷

Clearly, NATO was viewed as a useful tool of policy, not a policy aim with intrinsic value. The collective defense provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty did, of course, have military implications. Nevertheless, with some U.S. policymakers holding that a military alliance could provoke the Soviet Union, the Alliance did not immediately form a credible military structure;⁸ that would develop after Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons and the Korean War.⁹ The United States even stationed forces within the territory of NATO members to ensure U.S. involvement should the Soviets attack.¹⁰

Notably, the United States emerged as the de facto leader of the Alliance. First, and most obviously, the original NATO purpose, in the European view, was to ensure a U.S. security guarantee. Second, the United States possessed, then and now, the greatest military capability and potential among NATO members. Third, since “command structures have reflected realities based on military capabilities,” the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Atlantic are always United States officers.¹¹ Finally, the North Atlantic Treaty’s provisions for the

United States to be custodian of key documents were not trivial or procedural, since they suggest that member states had confidence in the United States that they did not share among themselves.

As noted, NATO was part of the larger grand strategy of containment. The Alliance's initial posture was consistent with the U.S. aim of avoiding strategic overextension while preventing Soviet expansion, building confident geopolitical areas that could withstand Soviet influence, and encouraging internal Soviet change by consistent and firm denial of Soviet foreign policy aims.¹² The policy was intended for the long term, conserved scarce resources, and did not pursue active defeat of Soviet power.¹³

Emphasizing measured action and conservation of resources, but also "maintenance of balance of power in the world," the grand strategy of which NATO was a part could be described as selective engagement (at most), based on a realist perspective of international relations.¹⁴ Soviet force would be balanced with confident regions of strength. Notably, while one could certainly argue that the USSR was originally motivated by expansionist Communist ideology, there is compelling evidence that at some point during the Cold War it moved toward a grand strategic view not unlike that of the United States in terms of its realist perspective. Both powers carefully gauged their respective military ability and developed a real aversion to direct confrontation, given their considerable mutual destructive ability.¹⁵ Another aspect of the realist world view is the concept of "spheres of influence."¹⁶ By the 1960s, NATO as a whole was convinced that changes in the Soviet bloc and an end to the East-West confrontation were best pursued through "stabilization and acceptance of the existing order." With the Helsinki Final Act

agreement, the USSR, interpreting the allied view through its realist lens, believed that the West recognized a legitimate Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.¹⁷

Russia and NATO After the Cold War

While our electoral system makes continuity in foreign policy a real challenge, it is unfortunate that in prosecuting the Cold War, the United States took “the first step without considering the last.”¹⁸ Admittedly, as John Lewis Gaddis observed, “The abrupt end of the Cold War . . . astonished everyone, whether in government, the academy, the media, or the think tanks.”¹⁹ Thus, it is regrettable but not remarkable that the United States failed to consider Russian perceptions and associated expectations regarding NATO as the Soviet Union, its satellites, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. There is less excuse for the U.S. failure to appreciate Russia’s perception that enlargement is a hostile act.

Russian Perceptions and Expectations

World View

As noted, Russia perceived that the West recognized its sphere of influence, just as it claimed to recognize Western Europe as a U.S. sphere of influence. After the Cold War, Russia reasonably perceived itself as a great power and so expected to take part in

equal participation of the former opponents in the Cold War. Naturally enough such a system would have been impossible without Russia . . . the only country in the world with vital interests in both Europe and Asia.²⁰

Such a system would represent a “strategic partnership” *with the United States*, not NATO.²¹ The system would include a pan-European collective security system distinct from collective

defense-oriented alliances and would “move toward a world without wars.”²²

Soviet talk of a true collective security system, with its bent toward a liberal view of the international system and associated concepts such as the interdependence of states and the indivisibility of peace, was probably rhetoric.²³ First, after broaching the proposal for a collective security system, the USSR made strident efforts to retain influence over the Baltic republics and prevent Hungary and Romania from “joining any alliance that Moscow considered opposed to its interests.”²⁴ Second, the proposals were largely a result of the specter of a reunified Germany.²⁵ These factors suggest that, though ostensibly Marxist, the USSR followed some elements of a traditional realist world view which, with its associated concepts of balance of power and spheres of influence, would have been inconsistent with a collective security system. Russia maintains the realist view of its Soviet predecessor:

Military force still means a lot. . . . The system of military blocs in Europe and the APR [Asian Pacific Rim] created by the United States is still in place. As a result, a new security system with Russia's participation was never created.²⁶

The critical point for the United States and NATO is this. When NATO was established, the United States maintained a realist world view, but as the Cold War developed, the USSR likewise adopted elements of a realist perspective. Since the demise of the USSR, the United States has maintained an essentially liberal world view.²⁷ While maintenance of NATO and its enlargement are in harmony with the liberal view of cooperative security with “overlapping, mutually reinforcing arrangements,” it is absolutely in conflict with Russia’s realist perspective.²⁸ The United States

must understand that a realist Russia will view as a threat the very concepts the liberal perspective finds beneficial in keeping the peace. Promotion of institutions, interdependence, economic development, and democratic forms can be easily viewed as aggression and unwarranted violations of sovereignty from a realist standpoint.²⁹ Most disturbingly, Russia not only does not subscribe to a world view conflicting with that of the United States, but also perceives that the United States does not subscribe to a liberal view, American pronouncements notwithstanding:

The United States are out to fix their victory in the Cold War and a new balance of forces in Europe. Naturally enough, NATO has no intention to discuss a parity with the Russian Federation.³⁰

The Cold War

As Dmitri Trenin observed during the NATO New Millennium symposium, Russia viewed the Cold War as a real war,³¹ a view that has merit in the Clausewitzian sense. Although the United States and USSR never came to direct blows, they did use varying degrees of direct and indirect force in an attempt to impose their will on each other and fulfill their policy aims. The United States used force to deter Soviet aggression, directly fought real or perceived Soviet proxy states, and armed anti-Communist regimes. The USSR used force to maintain its satellites, indirectly support Communist insurrection efforts, and directly (as in Afghanistan) support regimes that would oppose U.S. interests. However, much like Germany after the First World War, Russia did not perceive itself as a defeated belligerent.³² To the contrary, Russia perceived that it was making incredible internal and external sacrifices to accommodate the West:

Troops were withdrawn from foreign and former Soviet soil . . . Russia refrained from attempting to militarize the Commonwealth of Independent States. Moscow also supported United Nations' sanctions against Iraq, accepted the American formula for nuclear force ceilings . . . and worked with NATO peacekeepers in Bosnia.³³

While one could argue that Russia was a defeated foe, because the aim of containment was an internal change in the USSR, it is important to note that the change was intended to come about, indirectly from the continued failures of Soviet foreign policy.³⁴ As one Russian commentator has noted:

The end of the Cold War cannot in principle be seen in terms of "victory" or "loss" because it was a war of positions, a war of ideologies . . . of two lifestyles which had the semblance of a historical contest.³⁵

As a bested but undefeated foe in the Cold War, Russia expected to take part in the equivalent of a negotiated peace and, perhaps unreasonably, receive economic assistance from the West similar to that received by Western Europe and Japan after the Second World War.³⁶

Russian expectations have not been met. First, Russia perceives that the United States has expressed inordinate triumph over the demise of the Soviet state and considers references to "leadership" in the current National Security Strategy to be based on a claimed victory over the USSR.³⁷ Second, Russian hopes of economic recovery have been disappointed. Since 1990 the Russian economy has deteriorated to the point of "primitive market relations, 'real socialism', and barter"; industrial and agricultural production has dropped 70 and 50 percent, respectively, and Russia represents a mere 1 percent of world trade and less than 1 percent of world gross domestic product.³⁸

And conditions do not appear to be improving, with industries producing products and services worth less than the resources consumed in the production process.³⁹ Russia is also suffering an inoperative banking system, high inflation, tremendous debt, high unemployment, decaying living conditions, and a mortality rate that exceeds the birth rate.⁴⁰ Russians perceive that U.S. support for incompetent Russian economic policymakers makes the United States “responsible for the results of the nineties in Russia.”⁴¹ By some standards, financial assistance to Russia was insufficient, and U.S. trade policy tended to exclude Russian resources from the international market.⁴² While the Russian “young reformers” are to a great extent responsible for Russia’s economic woes, and the availability of Western aid may have been counterproductive, the United States must be aware of the *Russian* perception; the West, and the United States in particular, proclaimed Russia a defeated enemy and proceeded with its internal destruction.⁴³

The Persistence of NATO

The USSR incorrectly perceived NATO to be the equivalent of the Warsaw Pact, “an instrument of control for the Soviet Politburo and allied Communist dictators in the East European Satellite states. It functioned as a mechanism to enforce obedience whenever local elites dared to deviate from the Soviet line.”⁴⁴ This perception endures. Because the Warsaw Pact was coercive and countered a perceived threat, and NATO was essentially equivalent to that organization, NATO must be a threat to Russian security.⁴⁵ Thus, it is no surprise that a realist Russia expected NATO to dissolve when the Warsaw Pact dissolved, because the purpose of NATO was to provide a defense against a threat that no longer existed.⁴⁶ However, in the

immediate aftermath of the Cold War, Russia's intentions regarding Western Europe were not entirely clear, and it still possessed considerable combat power.⁴⁷ Furthermore, NATO provided more value to the United States and the West than strict collective defense: NATO gave the United States considerable control over European security, managed conflict among members, and guaranteed a pacific Germany.⁴⁸ Further, organizational factors could not be ignored:

No organization goes out of business quickly or willingly . . . NATO is now buttressed by . . . an extensive cadre of former NATO officials, defense intellectuals, military officers . . . and journalists. . . . Ending the Alliance would remove their main professional preoccupation and call a halt to the endless series of conferences that these elites have long enjoyed.⁴⁹

Russia maintains that NATO is a "military alliance that has served its purpose," but, at least until current NATO operations, Russia reluctantly recognized the continued NATO presence as an undeniable fact and agreed to maintain liaison with the Alliance to influence NATO actions viewed as harmful to its security.⁵⁰

Perceptions of NATO Expansion

Apart from the issue of NATO dissolution, Russia absolutely expected NATO to refrain from expansion, whatever the Alliance's eventual fate:

When the West was vitally interested in the Soviet troop withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic and wanted us "to swallow the bitter pill," the disintegration of the Warsaw Treaty Organization . . . all of them [Western policymakers] said one and the same thing:

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NATO will not move to the east by a single inch and not a single Warsaw Pact country will be admitted to NATO.⁵¹

While proponents of enlargement have noted that no *formal* guarantee was proffered regarding NATO expansion, they do not deny that discussions of that type were held between Soviet and Western policymakers; however, they suggest that, because such an agreement contains tacit acknowledgement of a balance of power and sphere of influence, it is not valid.⁵² The moral superiority of one world view or the other is less relevant than the fact that the United States will be confronted with a Russia that perceives itself a victim of bad faith in a matter of security:

Talk that this is a different NATO, a NATO that is no longer a military alliance, is ridiculous. It is like saying that the hulking thing advancing toward your garden is not a tank because it is painted pink, carries flowers, and plays cheerful music. It does not matter how you dress it up; a pink tank is still a tank.⁵³

U.S. policymakers have taken pains to reassure Russia that NATO is no security threat and that Russia will, in fact, benefit from the stability inherent in NATO expansion in Eastern Europe.⁵⁴ There is nothing but wisdom in reassuring a nervous state. However, U.S. policymakers have also maintained that making any modifications in America's NATO policy in deference to Russian sensibilities is unwise and would encourage that country to oppose the West; over time, liaisons between NATO and Russia will convince Russia that NATO is benign.⁵⁵ This view is curiously like that of Imperial Germany in the decade prior to the First World War: the best way to win the cooperation and support of foreign states is to intimidate them and make no concessions to their sensibilities.⁵⁶ Whether the

United States will be any more successful than Germany in this regard is an open question.

Russia's dismay at enlargement is understandable, because the United States did not promote expansion until 1994.⁵⁷ In fact, Russia joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program because it initially viewed that program as a much less objectionable substitute for expansion. Each PFP state enjoyed bilateral links with NATO and cooperated with NATO in planning, compatibility of doctrine and equipment, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations but did not enjoy the Article 5 security guarantee.⁵⁸

Unfortunately, the U.S. decision "came only over time and not always through a formal decisionmaking process."⁵⁹ Policymakers cannot even say when, exactly, the decision was made.⁶⁰ At any rate, the same organizational dynamics that helped dictate NATO persistence also spurred enlargement with a "grow or die" mentality.⁶¹ Also, domestic ethnic constituencies and members of Congress exerted pressure on policymakers to support expansion.⁶² NATO members also figured in the decision. Germany expressed a moral duty to support enlargement in light of its historic role in Europe's wars, and Poland and the Czech Republic exerted pressure for membership.⁶³ However, it is important to note that traditional balance of power and security considerations also figured in European calculations. Germany has a preference to "defend Germany in Poland."⁶⁴ France, while expressing concern over Russian reaction, attempted to exchange support for expansion for a diminished American presence in NATO command structures; and Turkey attempted to exchange its support for a seat in the European Union (EU).⁶⁴

The United States promoted expansion at length for the stated aims of securing the new democracies in Central Europe, defusing latent intra-European conflicts, promoting economic prosperity, and ensuring an integrated Europe.⁶⁵ The Alliance now was not the tool to protect a developing Europe but the very means to prosperity. Defense from Russian aggression was not ignored but deliberately minimized as an aim, which is not unreasonable considering Russia's military capability.⁶⁶ Significantly, U.S. cost estimates of NATO expansion were based on a benign Russia.⁶⁷

While it would be going too far to say that enlargement was an act of war in Russian eyes, the same dynamics apply: any object of forced compliance is liable to react in completely unpredictable ways.⁶⁸ While domestic concerns are legitimate considerations for policymakers, the decision to maintain and expand NATO focused not on the Alliance as a tool of U.S. policy but as an end in its own right. Viewing an alliance as an end rather than a means prevents objective gauging of an opponent's possible reaction. It has been so with Russia.

Russia's Importance to the United States

One could certainly make the case that the Russia of 1999 is a weak power, based on its current military and economic conditions, and is therefore unworthy of much consideration.⁶⁹ However, Russia must be taken seriously, because, apart from current interaction with other states, it represents significant potential as well as danger—Russia could eventually “assert its prerogative as a great power.”⁷⁰ Also, the United States is risking overextension because current forces are insufficient for the current National Security Strategy. Finally, the United States

will find NATO and Europe progressively less reliable allies in carrying out U.S. security obligations. The United States must not ignore Russia as a potential hedge against the loss of traditional allied support.

Military Potential

Relative to NATO, Russia's conventional military capability is currently quantitatively and qualitatively inferior, and its military is in poor condition by any absolute measure:

shortages of able-bodied personnel, . . . desertion, draft evasion, malnutrition, and illness; inadequate and unpaid salaries, deficiencies in food, clothing and housing, even for officers; under funded and insufficient training and maintenance; and, above all, a dramatic decline in status, morale, cohesion, and discipline, with growing . . . crime and corruption.⁷¹

Russia also lacks significant power-projection capability, and any improvement in its armed forces will be in the long term.⁷² Nevertheless, Russia's mobilization potential remains significant, and, given its access to significant natural resources, its current military state is unlikely to be permanent.⁷³

Of more immediate concern, in an effort to compensate for a fast-disappearing conventional capability and frustrated by its inability to reverse the trend, Russia is emphasizing the use of tactical nuclear weapons in the stead of conventional forces.⁷⁴ For the United States, the implication is that Russia has a dreadfully inflexible military tool at its disposal. While this inflexibility may prevent any Russian response to undesirable actions by other states, it also means that Russia may be compelled to use nuclear weapons without sufficient warning to

an offending state. Much like the United States in the early Cold War, Russia cannot react effectively at a level below the nuclear threshold⁷⁵ and is unable signal its displeasure by lesser military actions that represent an invitation to defuse a crisis. The United States, therefore, must ensure that Russia is not provoked into an unexpected reaction. In this vein, the United States has long desired Russian ratification of the START II Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty as "an essential element of our national security strategy."⁷⁶ Russia views the START II treaty to be in its interests as a means to sustain affordable parity with the United States but has delayed ratification of the treaty because of NATO enlargement; current operations have cast even more doubt on the agreement's fate.⁷⁷

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Preventing WMD proliferation figures prominently in current U.S. policy.⁷⁸ According to one source, "Russia is the largest warehouse in the world of nuclear weapons, materials, and expertise."⁷⁹ If Russia's disposition of these resources is influenced by NATO in the same way START II ratification was, U.S. interests will not be served.

Economic Potential

As noted, Russia has severe economic problems. However, Russia does not perceive its economic condition to be permanently stark in light of its geographic position, natural resources, and consumer potential.⁸⁰ European energy consumption trends may make Russian oil increasingly important, especially if Russia is able to consolidate control of Caspian Sea oil transshipment routes.⁸¹

Overextension and NATO

Overextension. Current National Security Strategy is far different from the limited strategy of containment existing at NATO formation; the strategy indicates three overall foreign policy aims: security, prosperity, and encouraging “democracy abroad”⁸² and includes elements of primacy, cooperative security, and selective engagement, supported by a liberal view that “connects the security of the United States . . . to a host of distant troubles.”⁸³ These concerns can erupt anywhere on the globe, because it is in “Europe, East Asia and Southwest Asia where the United States has clear, vital interests.”⁸⁴ By some measures, the current National Security Strategy exceeds present military capabilities and force levels,⁸⁵ and the latest *Quadrennial Defense Review* proposes further reductions in both support and combat forces.⁸⁶ Even *The Brookings Review*, a liberal journal, has expressed concern over a “less reliable, less safe, and less effective” force.⁸⁷ The United States must not deprive itself of any possible ally who can lessen the strain on U.S. resources by promoting U.S. interests in problem areas.

Europe and a Less Effective NATO. A state can also overextend itself in terms of the willingness of allies to support that state’s policy aims. In spite of its origins, NATO is now described as “the cornerstone” of U.S. security.⁸⁸ NATO is also presented as “the most successful political-military alliance in history.”⁸⁹ Undoubtedly, the Alliance has been successful in light of its original aims—Western Europe has prospered since 1949: former Western European opponents developed close relations in spite of latent mutual suspicions, Western economies thrived in a secure environment, and democratic forms were presented as a viable alternative to communism.⁹⁰ Member states allowed the United States to provide a tremendous portion of their security,

base troops on their soil, and arbitrate their disagreements precisely because they did not fear American power, at least not to the extent that they feared their own power or that of the USSR. Indeed, they found that “it is nice to have an extracontinental player in the game that is bigger than each and all but is also more of an elephant than a Tyrannosaurus.”⁹¹ Further, NATO served to restrain possibly unwise U.S. action—the United States refrained from pursuing total victory in Korea in part to maintain Alliance cohesion.⁹²

As beneficial as they were, Alliance dynamics operated primarily because of external pressure; the Soviet threat proved “remarkably reliable” in keeping the allies together.⁹³ Internal disputes were minimized, because all states shared an interest in deterring Soviet aggression.⁹⁴ This external pressure no longer exists. Some argue that Europe and the United States are the only sure guarantees of world stability and must act together in this regard.⁹⁵ However, NATO members are reducing military spending, and Europe has no intention of providing security in Asia, opposes U.S. policies in the Middle East, and may become an economic rival of the United States.⁹⁶ Additionally, NATO allies do not share U.S. concern with international terrorism, and this European emphasis on economic aims over security responsibilities has caused a rift with U.S. policymakers.⁹⁷ NATO is developing a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to build capabilities not necessarily based on U.S. participation but relying on U.S. equipment; it is unlikely that the United States will agree to NATO missions inconsistent with U.S. aims.⁹⁸ Depending upon Europe’s enthusiasm for the concept, ESDI could erode cohesion.

Enlargement advocates argue that a larger NATO will prevent conflict and increase NATO military capability.⁹⁹ However,

some Europeans have opposed enlargement, because the poor military capability of new members may threaten collective NATO defense capability.¹⁰⁰ Furthermore, the agreement implicit in the NATO-Russia Founding Act to refrain from permanent troop deployments in new member states removes the automatic guarantee of NATO involvement should they be attacked.¹⁰¹

The Alliance is also undertaking operations outside the territory of member states, which is consistent with Alliance determination to conduct missions beyond traditional collective defense.¹⁰² However, it is worth recalling Clausewitz's warning:

A country may support another's cause, but will never take it so seriously as it takes its own . . . if things go wrong the operation is pretty well written off, and one tries to withdraw at the smallest possible cost.¹⁰³

Furthermore, from the European view, there is growing resentment toward U.S. leadership and sentiment that "U.S. global concerns do not necessarily coincide with the vital interests of the European allies."¹⁰⁴ This resentment could be aggravated if the absence of an external threat encourages unwise action by the Alliance's leader; the motivation to avoid direct confrontation with potentially dangerous adversaries is now missing. Similarly, the United States might, out of enthusiasm for the Alliance, coerce allies into unwise operations they will not long support, resembling Joffe's Tyrannosaurus and losing the benefits of being viewed as an elephant.¹⁰⁵

NATO Inflexibility. Finally, insistence on applying NATO to every problem may prevent the flexibility needed to resolve complicated security problems. For instance, current U.S. doctrine emphasizes that a government's legitimacy is the key to

effective counterinsurgency; legitimacy and humane action on the part of a government can be encouraged if an intervening power provides assistance to that government contingent upon an improvement in behavior.¹⁰⁶ NATO, as a multilateral organization, does not lend itself to these sorts of bilateral efforts. The use of NATO can also exclude the good offices of nonmembers, like Russia, who could prove effective intermediaries. Because the United States is nearing overextension, Europe is an uncertain ally, and NATO is a less effective tool of policy, it behooves the United States to explore all possible areas of security cooperation with Russia.

Flexible Security: Threats and Opportunities

Russian Reaction

As a result of dashed expectations and perceived mistreatment at the hands of the West, particularly the United States, Russia has, at a fundamental level, turned from cooperation with the West and is pursuing the role of international spoiler of American policy aims, even when it agrees with them in. Aside from the more or less serious aggravation of this reaction, Russia will turn its attention to areas of strategic interest to the United States.¹⁰⁷ In effect, the United States has provided itself with a built-in opponent in any policy endeavor.

The United States must understand that the NATO-Russia Founding Act Agreement, viewed by NATO as the center of “significant efforts to secure Russian cooperation,” is seen by Russia as a “sop.” More dangerously, some Russian policymakers erroneously view the agreement as recognizing spheres of influence and obligating NATO to seek Russian concurrence on NATO action.¹⁰⁸ This misunderstanding sets the stage for tragic

miscalculation on both sides. A flexible security relationship with Russia is, however, possible.

In accordance with its realist world view, Russia would much prefer a relationship with the United States as a state rather than with the Alliance.¹⁰⁹ Russia realizes that confrontation with the United States will aggravate that country's already dire economic position.¹¹⁰ Also, Russia's reaction is based more on anger and frustration than on principled support of other states. Samuel Huntington notes that, to avoid overextension, the United States should work for a world in which regional powers can provide stability without U.S. intervention.¹¹¹ However, even if the United States embarks on such a course, its regional security commitments must be maintained. To do otherwise would profoundly damage U.S. credibility and honor for a very long time, perhaps permanently. Therefore, each area of conflict suggests opportunities for beneficial cooperation with Russia, especially when one considers the cultural differences between the United States and troubled regions.¹¹² The United States should support Russian efforts in these areas if a correlation can be made with U.S. interests. The United States will then have tangible leverage to encourage desirable Russian behavior. Over time, if the United States can regain Russia's goodwill, Russia could represent U.S. interests to other states of regional concern as a "bridge state," a role it may be aptly equipped to assume:

One of the features of our Eurasian uniqueness . . . is that during the many centuries of our cooperation with the Eastern and Western neighbors we have learned to understand both sides.¹¹³

Asia. In part to balance perceived U.S. primacy, Russia is cooperating with China against U.S. interests,¹¹⁴ which should concern the United States. According to one study, the

resources, economic potential, and trade links between the United States and the Asia-Pacific region make hegemonic domination of that region a threat “second only to the preserving of the United States and its extended possessions.”¹¹⁵ Furthermore, bilateral treaty commitments, as well as the legal and moral obligation to provide for Taiwanese defense, render access to and stability of the region a vital interest. With allies unwilling to support a more vigorous China policy, U.S. policymakers have attempted to deal with Sino-U.S. disputes through engagement while “China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in Asia.”¹¹⁶ China is encouraging Russian opposition to NATO enlargement, and Russia is agreeing to support Chinese ambitions for Taiwan.¹¹⁷ Russia has negotiated troop withdrawal on the Sino-Russian border, is engaged in a significant arms trade with China, and has plans to supply China with Russian oil.¹¹⁸

Regarding India, U.S. policymakers are rightly concerned with that state’s possession of nuclear weapons but have given insufficient attention to India’s primary justification for developing those weapons: fear of Pakistan and China.¹¹⁹ Russia has developed links with India as a response to a perceived loss of world influence and is actively cooperating with conventional arms sales and development of launch vehicles.¹²⁰

In spite of these actions, the United States could turn Russian involvement in the region to good account. In spite of cooperation with China, Russia views that country as a rival in Central Asia and is alarmed at the development of Chinese military capability.¹²¹ Russia has turned to China chiefly because of perceived rejection by the West; it therefore follows that better relations with Russia would allow a healthy balancing of China. Furthermore, arms sales to India are based more on financial

need, not on principled support.¹²² While Russia supports Indian possession of nuclear weapons, it also supports cessation of further testing.¹²³ The United States should recognize legitimate Indian security concerns and appreciate the possible stabilizing effect of Indian nuclear weapons in the region as a balance to China. The United States should support Indian-Russian commercial links working with Russia to ensure responsible Indian custodianship of nuclear weapons, possibly as part of a program that includes Russia's responsible disposition of its own nuclear material.¹²⁴

Middle East. In the Middle East, U.S. interests include access to oil, secure lines of communication, Israeli security, and the behavior of Iran and Iraq.¹²⁵ Russia has engaged in arms sales with Iran and Iraq and has provided Iran with nuclear technology. Although a competitor with Iran in the oil industry, Russia has also engaged Iran in development of Caspian Sea oil reserves as well as in manufacturing and transportation.¹²⁶ Iran, with its military and economic potential and tradition of U.S. relations, has shown signs of possible retrieval as a U.S. ally who could be invaluable in maintaining U.S. interests in a vital region.¹²⁷ The United States could work through established Russian-Iranian links toward that end, hopefully discouraging Russian support for Iraq and development of Iranian nuclear capabilities in the process. Russia claims it has turned to the Muslim world out of anger and shares a U.S. concern about radical Islam in the Newly Independent States (NIS) and could cooperate to minimize the threat.¹²⁸ While Israel has been suspect of Russia, at the very least Russia claims to be an ally of both Israel and Iran; the United States may find Russia useful in enhancing Israeli security.¹²⁹

Caucasus and Caspian Region. While the NATO-Russia Founding Act denies spheres of influence, Russia aims to reassert its influence over the NIS of the Caucasus and Caspian region. As part of the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS), these states are subject to Russian military presence and internal intervention.¹³⁰ In this area, Russia's interest is based not on preeve, but on principle, because these states were part of Imperial Russia.¹³¹ While these states value their independence, they also appreciate the benefits of a close relationship with Russia in light of economic and security ties.¹³² For the United States, Caspian Sea oil would "diversify world energy supplies."¹³³ The region could become even more vital to the United States if access to Middle Eastern oil is interrupted. The United States should quietly continue informal support for Russian influence in the region.¹³⁴ Failure to do so could encourage Chinese and Iranian influence in the CIS inimical to U.S. interests and could compel Russia to integrate the areas by force.¹³⁵ At any rate, NATO allies are unlikely to support U.S. opposition to a Russian sphere of influence in the region.¹³⁶ Most importantly, Russia views U.S. denial of a sphere of influence in the region to be a de facto promotion of a U.S. sphere of influence; it would be fruitless to argue the morality of the concept.¹³⁷ Support for Russian influence will secure access to regional resources, greatly improve U.S.-Russian relations, motivate Russian cooperation in other areas, and direct Russian attention from any lingering ambitions in the West. The United States must not, however, support Russia's claim of Caspian Sea oil transshipment routes over that of Turkey or Iran; a compromise providing multiple, and thus more secure, pipeline routes is preferable.¹³⁸

Salvaging Russian Cooperation

As suggested, the profound gulf between Russian and U.S. world views requires the United States to meet Russia in terms it can appreciate. Russia will not be converted to a liberal/cooperative security world view because it does not believe that the United States is committed to such a course. Unlike its policy toward China, the United States makes cooperation with Russia contingent on internal reform and on a foreign policy that does not conflict with that of the United States.¹³⁹ Given Russian views about an expanding West, this policy could be counterproductive. To pursue a state-to-state relationship with Russia, the United States must change its NATO policy while also providing for the security of the NIS.

NATO enlargement has occurred, and for good or ill, the United States is committed to the defense of three additional states. While honoring this commitment, the United States should change its policy so that the benefits of Russian cooperation will not be lost forever. First, the United States must maintain its NATO involvement for the moment. A radical withdrawal would be disastrous for U.S. credibility and U.S.-European relations. However, the United States should encourage the development of an ESDI structure that will allow Europeans to deal with regional threats without U.S. participation, particularly if the Alliance intends, as has been recommended, to act without U.N. authority.¹⁴⁰ The ESDI should be structured to act within Europe only, with minimum reliance on U.S. power-projection assets. Most importantly, the United States must campaign actively for Europe to develop the will to act without the United States in European security matters. While the United States must maintain an interest in preventing the dominating of Europe by a hostile power, Europe

will become more responsible for its own internal security, freeing the United States to fulfill current global responsibilities.¹⁴¹

To maintain long-term Russian cooperation, the United States should withdraw support for further NATO enlargement. While this could be viewed as foregoing the promise of transforming NATO into a post-Cold War collective security system, this transformation is problematic because NATO cannot act without the consensus of its most powerful members, and NATO is placing faith in voluntary "coalitions of the willing."¹⁴² Neither condition is compatible with a true collective security system; both are not far removed from the NATO method of functioning in the Cold War.¹⁴³ Because Russia has raw nuclear capability and the potential to once again be a great power, any European security system must include Russia as a full member, but NATO allies generally oppose Russian membership.¹⁴⁴ Continued enlargement will only antagonize Russia further; therefore, foregoing enlargement will not sacrifice U.S. security interests.

Russia has indicated a willingness to recognize the neutrality of prospective NATO members, the Baltic states in particular.¹⁴⁵ This concept could be extended to states currently seeking NATO membership, except members of the CIS. Alan Tonelson has suggested that the neutral states would be obliged to extend special military privileges to Russia.¹⁴⁶ It would seem, however, that while neutrality is a viable option, special Russian privileges are not. First, while the affected states must accept their location next to a potential great power, their sensibilities must not be completely ignored; power can be recognized without encouraging misuse of that power. Neutrality should be absolutely guaranteed by NATO (as an alliance), the United

States (as a state), and Russia. As long as the guarantee is credible, the agreement would provide as much security for the NIS as they would enjoy as NATO members. Treating Russia with no greater or lesser regard than other significant states will confirm that Russia's potential is respected from a Western position of strength.

Conclusion

Current NATO operations no doubt harm an already sour relationship between Russia and the United States, but because Russia has turned from the United States out of anger rather than a fundamental divergence of interest, the opportunity for Russian cooperation still exists. However, the United States must engage Russia in realist terms appreciated by that country. The best aspects of containment emphasized the importance of confidence in allowing a state to withstand base influences. The United States should not seek to elicit Russian cooperation through intimidation, but from a standpoint that encourages Russian confidence by recognizing its potential. At the same time, the United States must itself be firm and confident in dealing with legitimate policy disputes. With finite resources, traditional allies less willing to support its policies, and NATO a less useful tool of policy, the United States should act now to secure the cooperation of a potentially powerful state that can accompany it where Europe cannot.

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Operational Art and the Human Dimension of Warfare in the 21st Century

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War is one of the most complicated and most chaotic of human endeavors. It is a complex interaction of factors under the most trying of conditions in pursuit of the most important of objectives. It is a violent transaction where political objectives are bought with the blood and treasure of a nation. Even as traditional, state-on-state “wars” yield to what American doctrine calls “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) across a spectrum of conflict,¹ the central aim of military operations remains the same—the application of military power to achieve certain ends.

Military power is a function of both will and means. In his classic study on the nature and practice of war, Clausewitz described the relationship between these two factors:

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If you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. *the total means at his disposal* and *the strength of his will*. The extent of the means at his disposal is a matter—though not exclusively—of figures, and should be measurable. But the strength of his will is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged approximately by the strength of the motive animating it.²

This essay uses Clausewitz's basic formula (*power = will x means*) as a starting point to examine the state of the operational art in American military theory and practice as we enter the 21st century. *Will* represents the human dimension of warfare, the incalculable and essentially unchanging moral factors that make war unpredictable and inevitable. *Means*, the second element, includes the physical factors, the tools of war. In American doctrine, the operational commander is the "warfighter" who employs our power (*will x means*) against an enemy's power (*will x means*) to achieve victory. This daunting task is the operational art. Success depends on how well the operational commander understands the relationship between *will* and *means* and employs the power under his command.

The information age is producing revolutionary changes in physical factors (*means*) that offer the potential for exponential improvement in our military capability. Service responses to this new technology tend only to reinforce existing cultural biases regarding the balance between moral and physical factors. Meanwhile, our immature joint warfighting concepts are dangerously reliant on technological superiority for success. While information age technology should be exploited to expand our capability, these changes will not alter the fundamental nature of war or the supremacy of moral factors (*will*) in combat. As we develop warfighting concepts for the 21st century, we must avoid

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the trap of the technological fix and focus on a better understanding of the human dimension of warfare. While the *science* of war in the information age will undoubtedly change, the *art* of war will remain decisive. In the operational art, technology remains necessary, but not sufficient for, success.

Will: The Human Dimension of Warfare

War is the most “human” of endeavors, for it always involves ultimate issues of life and death, as combatants use deadly force in an attempt to make their adversary submit to their will. Wars still begin on the basis of Thucydides’ distinctly human incentives of honor, fear, and self-interest. Once the organized violence of combat begins, all the best and worst of mankind appears—the noblest self-sacrifice and the most horrible atrocities. The military historian John Keegan poignantly captured this human dimension of warfare in *The Face of Battle*:

What battles have in common is human: the behaviour of men struggling to reconcile their instinct for self-preservation, their sense of honour and the achievement of some aim over which other men are ready to kill them. The study of battle is therefore always a study of fear and usually of courage; always of leadership, usually of obedience; always of compulsion, sometimes of insubordination; always of anxiety, sometimes of elation or catharsis; always of violence, sometimes also of cruelty, self-sacrifice, compassion; above all, it is always a study of solidarity and usually also of disintegration—for it is towards the disintegration of human groups that battle is directed.³

What makes us human is our capacity to make reasoned decisions. But decisionmaking in battle—whether by individual soldiers, commanders, or civilian leadership—is not always based on a rational calculus or complete information. Often choices are

a matter of intuition and a will to action rooted in such complicated emotions as honor (or disgrace), courage (or fear), and even love (or hate). Thus, the human dimension makes warfare inherently unpredictable. These hard-to-quantify moral factors are the basis of *will*, the critical first element of power. Clausewitz addressed the importance and inscrutability of these factors:

They [the moral factors] constitute the spirit that permeates war as a whole, and at an early stage they establish a close affinity with the will that moves and leads the whole mass of force, practically merging with it, since the will is itself a moral quantity. Unfortunately, they will not yield to academic wisdom. They cannot be classified or counted. They have to be seen or felt.⁴

The slow pace of human evolution means that the dynamics of human behavior are essentially changeless. Throughout history, we see again and again the same glories and the same follies. Keegan's "face of battle" shows itself at Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme—and wherever men fight. Often, the human dimension of war determines an outcome contrary to rational calculus or a simple comparison of means. Thus, war remains a uniquely human endeavor and fighting power remains inextricably linked to the moral factors that motivate and animate mankind.

Doctrinal rhetoric assigns a position of honor to the human dimension of warfare,⁵ but its importance is easy to overlook in peacetime or when we lack a peer competitor. As Helmuth von Moltke noted, "In peace, the moral element seldom comes to be of value; in war it forms the precondition of every victory."⁶ Our position as the world's only superpower lulls us into ignoring the element of will and placing our trust in clearly superior means. Further, the extent to which the moral factors "permeate war as a whole" is often glossed over when technological revolution

offers the hope of exponential improvements in means. The United States stands precisely at this dangerous point as technological change tempts us to conclude that even the very nature of war has changed.

Means: The Revolution in Military Affairs

Contrary to enigmatic moral factors, the physical elements of power—from economic capacity to specific platforms (ships, airplanes, tanks, etc) to supporting structures (communications, logistics, etc)—are more readily quantifiable. Of course, calculations of force include even the individual soldiers themselves, either in raw numbers or adjusted for intangible moral factors. At its most extreme, this practice of the science of war has reduced planning and execution to a rational calculus of force ratios that totally ignores the impact of irrational decisionmaking or “super human” achievement.⁷

While human behavior changes so slowly as to be negligible, the means men employ to kill each other sometimes change very rapidly. Precisely because war involves the most critical of consequences, societies have always raced to apply new technology to its conduct. In fact, much of military history is the study of the changing means of war, with emphasis on revolutionary changes in weaponry and techniques—for example, from crossbow to gunpowder to nuclear weapons. Undoubtedly, the information age we have entered is also revolutionizing the means of war. Futurists such as Alvin and Heidi Toffler offer a compelling argument that we are entering a new “third wave” world based on knowledge as the primary instrument of power. The industrial, mechanized second-wave world, where conflicts were decided by state-on-state total war is giving way to an information age where information technology

and the control and use of knowledge will become the prevailing paradigm.⁸

This epochal shift to an information age offers new technology and new modes of organization that portend a revolution in military affairs (RMA). Proponents of the RMA are calling for doctrinal innovation and organizational change to accompany radical new technological development and usher in a new age of warfare.⁹ While there are many variants to what the RMA may bring, “the revolution’s mortar and pestle are standoff weapons and information dominance,”¹⁰ which will allow masters of operational art to dominate all aspects of the battlefield—air, land, sea, undersea, space, and most importantly, cyberspace. The new technologies converge in an “American RMA” model that links intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; and precision munitions in a “system of systems” whose nexus offers a revolutionary increase in certainty and efficiency.¹¹

Third-Wave Warriors?

Believers in the revolution argue that “fundamental changes are affecting the very character of war,” including fundamental changes “dominated by the co-evolution of economics, information technology, and business processes and organizations.”¹² Many continue to emphasize the role of human, and may even consider it critical, but argue that the third-wave warrior is quite different from the classic model because “the changed nature of war places increasing value on education and expertise and less on old-fashioned military machismo and brute force.”¹³ The extreme position, however, denies *any* unique moral dimension to the warrior: “We may be special people in the armed forces, but we are not a special case.”¹⁴ As critics point

out, “There are no human factors in the American RMA model.”¹⁵

The information age is radically changing the tools of war, but people will still operate and direct those tools, people subject to the same physical, mental, and emotional limitations as the soldiers of earlier ages. Moreover, new technology can sometimes amplify the impact of human factors, such as night-fighting capability causing circadian rhythm imbalance and increased exhaustion. Further, human decisionmakers will still determine how, when, where, and why to employ the means of war. While standoff capabilities may reduce the number of troops exposed to traditional close combat, worldwide communications connectivity and information warfare will at the same time enlist a new army of cyberwarriors who will experience their own elements of stress. Thus, even for the third-wave warrior warfare will remain, as the Army describes it, “a test of the soldier’s will, courage, endurance, and skill.”¹⁶ Perhaps most importantly, war will still involve human interaction in a contest of wills, fought *with* technology and weapons but fought *for* hearts and minds.

Service Responses to the RMA

Despite the current trend toward “jointness,” the individual services are still responsible for organizing, training, and equipping our military forces—the decisionmakers an operational commander employs in battle. Carl Builder, in *The Masks of War*, analyzed service culture and its impact; his framework is a good starting point for examining service responses to the changing environment of the information age.¹⁷

Far removed from the close combat of the ground war, the Air Force and Navy both have historically focused on the means

side of the power equation. Born out of revolutionary technological change, the Air Force has always worshipped at the altar of technology, seeking better and better ways to employ awesome technology in air (and space), preferably against strategic targets to gain a decisive victory. Similarly, the Navy employs platforms at sea, undersea, in air, and over land to destroy enemy platforms, and similarly, networks to destroy enemy networks.

RMA enthusiasts in both services see information-age technology as an opportunity to perfect their favored battlefield roles. For the Air Force, improved intelligence and precision-strike capabilities have breathed new life into strategic attack theory. Colonel John Warden notes that new and better technology "has made it possible to destroy the physical side of the enemy."¹⁸ If enemy *means* (physical factors) is reduced to zero, enemy *will* (moral factors) should either crumble or be rendered irrelevant. Thus, war is reduced to a targeting problem, now finally solvable by the new technology of the information age. The only debate is over which targets are most appropriate.¹⁹ Strategic attack enthusiasts tout *Desert Storm's* air campaign as both proof of our capability to induce strategic paralysis and as a preview of 21st century warfare, where the technological superiority of our air power can result in decisive victory.²⁰

For the Navy, the prevailing concept for warfighting in the information age is network-centric warfare (NCW). Networked information, command and control, and shooter grids interact to exponentially increase battlespace awareness and combat power. Information superiority and standoff, precision-delivery capability are enablers for battlespace dominance in all dimensions.²¹ While perhaps revolutionary in its application of

networking concepts and technology, NCW is an evolutionary change in the traditional Navy warfighting concept—from platform versus platform to network versus network (or our network-centric versus their platform-centric). The operational commander's aim is still the protection of our means and destruction of the enemy's.

Both strategic attack and network-centric warfare are subject to similar critiques. While the Air Force sees technological advantage as an overpowering strength, strategic attack critics fear an over-reliance on “technological asymmetry.”²² Likewise, NCW threatens to replace strategy with technology. The increased combat power “is manifested by high probability engagements against threats capable of defeating a platform-centric defense.”²³ NCW is a vision for Navy battlespace dominance, but a clear connection to operational or strategic objectives is lacking.

The foundation of success for both concepts is perfect information. The underlying premise is that if you can see everything on the battlefield and your enemy cannot, you will win. Thus, the latest version of strategic attack eliminates Clausewitz's fog and friction. New technology enables us to know completely the enemy's physical factors, isolate them from moral factors, and completely destroy (or paralyze) them. As critics have pointed out, NCW also makes an assumption of near-perfect knowledge and American information superiority—an invalid assumption in all scenarios, foreshadowed by our recent experiences in Somalia, where a low-tech enemy clearly had a decisive information advantage over us.²⁴ If visions of near-perfect information were attainable, they still would not account for the unpredictable interaction between opponents that forms

the heart of conflict. Even perfect, real-time information cannot predict enemy actions with any degree of certainty.

Finally, the fatal flaw of both these concepts, if viewed as independent paths to victory, is that they clearly place means above will. Even believers in "the mystique of U. S. air power" recognize the difficulty of applying it against the will of an enemy leader or his people.²⁵ If our power is inextricably tied to means-versus-means approaches that ignore or underestimate the human dimension of warfare, we are susceptible to precisely the kinds of asymmetrical responses that are likely to characterize post-Cold War conflicts. An implacable enemy can effectively target our will without matching our sophisticated means. And the bare hands of a determined last enemy soldier or civilian are still means, unless we are willing to kill them all!

Not surprisingly, the tension between technology and the human dimension is most apparent where the boots hit the mud. The Marine Corps, whose altar is the Corps of Marines itself, has always grounded its ethos in the supremacy of the moral element in war. The Corps' current slogan, "making Marines, winning battles," is a concise reflection of that culture. Success in battle—*any* battle—is ultimately dependent on the character and training of the individual Marine. In fact, recent operational experience and training exercises have led toward further emphasis on the human dimension, considered critical in the 21st century warfare the Commandant calls "the three block war."²⁶ Marine noncommissioned officers will make strategic decisions on confused urban battlefields where operations may escalate from humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping to violent armed conflict within a three-block area in a matter of hours. Facing this vision of future war, the Marines are insistent that "our

forces must be able to handle those things that technology alone cannot solve.”²⁷

Marine Corps respect for the human dimension of war and skepticism of the RMA is especially relevant because of the Corps record of successful innovation and historical experience in “small wars” strikingly similar to the kinds of MOOTW becoming commonplace in the post-Cold War world. But to compete for resources for an improved 21st century amphibious capability (the MV-22 Osprey helicopter, the advanced amphibious assault vehicle), the Marine Corps must also sing the praises of revolutionary new technology. Moreover, if the Marine Corps does not actively pursue technological modernization, especially in information and communications systems, it risks being incapable of effective participation with its sister services in high-tech, information-age warfare. The challenge is to be prepared for MOOTW (its historical niche and cultural preference) *and* the joint information-age battlefield of a major theater war.

Army response to the RMA may be most telling for the future direction of our military. As Builder notes, “The Army’s dream of war . . . if irrelevant to the actual wars it may be asked to fight, is likely to be more costly to the nation’s vital interests. . . . What the Army contributes most to any conflict are people trained in those arts of war relevant to the conflict at hand.”²⁸ Builder goes on to analyze what he characterizes as “the Army’s identity crisis” as it tries to move from a clear-cut European, Cold War strategy to a guess at what the next war will hold.²⁹ This identity crisis carries over into the debate over the human dimension of combat.

While the Army has traditionally been a people-oriented venture, it is lured to the high-tech “toys” that will best equip it for the sophisticated, information-age battlefield. A tendency to

fight platforms, Navy style, is apparent, especially when the platforms are as capable as the Army's current inventory. Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer gives evidence of this shift by noting, "We are building systems that far outstrip the limits of human endurance," and by looking to a "multiple crew" concept to keep platforms engaged in the fight beyond the limits of their crews.³⁰ Army initiatives embedded in Force XXI and the Army After Next, such as the digitization of the battlefield, seek to drastically improve capability by harnessing the new technologies of the information age. In fact, the Army is even coming to consider the individual soldier as "both a subsystem of our aircraft and ground vehicles, and as a system himself."³¹

The Army is attempting to walk the line between high-tech, information-age capability and a renewed focus on people skills, such as leadership and decisionmaking. Even while radically altering equipment and organizations, the Army is trying to "focus on fundamentals of soldiering in these tough turbulent times."³² Recent professional Army journals reveal an unmistakable call for more emphasis on what stays the same (leadership, training, cohesion) and less on what changes (technology, equipment).³³ Further, Army traditionalists resist radical doctrinal and organizational changes, insisting that dominant maneuver requires a large, conventional land army and that decisive victory will always ultimately depend on soldiers on the ground.³⁴

The Army attempt to incorporate new means, but also to enable its soldiers and commanders, not replace them, represents a good balance between the human and technological dimensions. Despite RMA enthusiasts' frustrations at the slow pace of change in the Army, its traditional view of warfare and cautious approach to new technology match its cultural

preferences and are appropriate to its important role as a conventional, manpower based force. But, like the Marine Corps, the danger for the Army is that it is preparing for the wrong war. The Army focus in training, organization, and equipment is on large-scale land combat, based on the assumption that, given reasonable training time, forces can successfully shift to MOOTW. A return to a period of “small wars” where moral factors are both overwhelmingly critical to success and exceedingly difficult to understand and employ will test this assumption. The risk the Army is accepting is that the 21st century land warrior may be incapable of fighting and winning in an environment where his technological edge is inapplicable or irrelevant.

Joint Warfighting: An American Way of War?

Russell Weigley and others have documented the development of an “American way of war” centered on technology.³⁵ While America resorted to an attrition strategy when necessary, our cultural preference is for a quick victory with minimum casualties in a strategy of annihilation. This concept is now expressly delineated in doctrine, with the significant modification of minimizing even enemy casualties. Thus, in war “the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible.”³⁶ The American way of war reflects both our love for technological “things” ever bigger, faster, and better and our deep-rooted core belief in the sanctity and superiority of the individual. The discussed approaches to war in the information age reflect this dichotomy. We are drawn to new technology (information technology, sensor networks, precision weapons) that promises quick, decisive victories with minimum casualties on both sides and that also takes advantage of our perceived superiority in the

moral factors of will, morale, and initiative. Our recent success in *Desert Storm* raises the expectations that we can win such victories and tempts us to conclude (erroneously) that "our" way is always best and always suitable.

Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010) is a "conceptual template for future joint warfighting"³⁷ that walks the line between the two poles of the American way of war—between the critical role of people and the use of ever more dazzling technology as a means to win at acceptable cost. *JV2010* is thus a vision of how to "strengthen our military capabilities by taking advantage of improved technology and the vitality and innovation of our people to prepare our forces for the 21st century."³⁸ But technology is clearly at the core of joint warfighting, as our national military strategy, *JV2010*, and the growing body of joint doctrine all build, in the words of one critic, "an operational template that converts technological superiority into operational concepts for gaining rapid decisive strategic superiority and victory."³⁹

The warfighting concept of *JV2010* is fundamentally flawed on several counts. First, it prepares us only for the American style war: short, hi-tech, and decisive. We are planning to fight someone who fights like us and thinks like us. Thus, the basis for the *JV2010* framework (and essential pre-cursor to success) is information superiority. Or, as the strongest believers in the information revolution propose, our superior capability as a culture to process and use information will itself prove decisive.⁴⁰ Both views are dangerously ethnocentric: not all actors prefer peace to war; not all opponents hold human life in the same high regard we do; and not all opponents will opt to compete head to head against our technological advantage. In fact, clever enemies will recognize and exploit these differences by challenging us asymmetrically.

Most importantly, *JV2010* assumes that dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection are always the correct ways to achieve our strategic ends throughout “the full range of military operations.”⁴¹ Rather than focusing on how we can apply military power to achieve strategic aims, we are focusing on how to acquire and employ better and better means, presupposing that these means are appropriate to the ends desired. For example, battlespace dominance may not be the right application of force to “shape” the strategic environment or “respond” across the spectrum of conflict as our national military strategy calls us to do.⁴² Carl Builder thus cited *JV2010* as an example of “tactical thinking.”⁴³ It assumes that superior means will automatically lead to victory—but ignores the human dimension of warfare at the strategic level, both in our enemy and in our own civilian and military strategic leadership who must choose the correct strategy to defeat the enemy will.

Business Models and the New “Science” of War

Many military innovators are turning to a business world fundamentally altered by information technology for answers on how to organize, equip, and fight an information-age military, drawing on models such as “learning organizations” and “self-synchronization.”⁴⁴ Most of these approaches call for revolutionary changes in organization and practice that threaten traditional military methods just as they challenged and altered conventional corporate organization and culture. For example, information technology has enabled businesses to flatten organizational structure. By pushing information and decisionmaking down, the best organizations become self-synchronizing, adjusting to changes more quickly and effectively

than old-style hierarchical organizations and even altering the organization itself in response to changing situations or requirements.

The danger in applying business solutions to the conduct of war is in failing to recognize what is *not* transferable. For example, an instinct for self-preservation alien to business may compel a company commander in a firefight to call for as much fire support as he can get, even though the support might best be used elsewhere in "the system." Certainly, applying so-called "better business practices" to acquisition, logistics, and other business-like support functions has been valuable and worthwhile. But on many levels, war is not analogous to business, and we should be wary of approaches that ignore the differences. Network-centric warfare, for example, is a direct and unabashed call for the military to emulate information-age business methods, merititing a rebuttal from Colonel T. X. Hammes, "War Isn't a Rational Business."⁴⁵

The significance of the human dimension in warfare is precisely what distinguishes it from private enterprise. The military profession *is* a special case, because we are authorized to kill and are willing to be killed. Certain tasks are reserved for governments alone (most significantly the use of force) precisely because they cannot be accomplished under the motives of self-interest that animate business life.⁴⁶ Organizations conducting transactions in human lives require different rules and procedures than those focusing on money.

Similar to the hopes of applying successful business models to the problems of war is the application of the so-called "new sciences," such as chaos and complexity theories. These models renew the search for scientific methods to understand and predict human behavior and are the latest attempt to perfect a science of

war. The appeal is obvious, as such theories seem to satisfy the requirements for better modeling and prediction necessary for perfect information and rational expectations of human behavior. But quantifying the moral factors involved in war is a vain hope. In fact, the more complex the system or endeavor, the more a single input upsets the predicted outcome.⁴⁷ Rather than creating a new science of war, then, our increasing knowledge about complexity, chaos, and the behavior of systems seems instead to reinforce the significance of the human dimension of warfare. The single heroic or irrational or foolish action may have an even greater impact as war becomes more complex.

Operational Art

American operational commanders in the information age will be expected to win “the American way” using the capabilities developed by the services and melded together in the joint arena. They will operate across the levels of war and make critical decisions about how, where, and when to apply combat power in order to achieve strategic aims. The services’ different warfighting concepts and distinct cultural identities can be strengths if matched to the right tasks and applied in creative combinations to create synergistic effects. The operational commander must recognize service strengths *and* weaknesses and, above all, understand the relationship of will and means to combat power.

Two roles of the operational commander are particularly related to the human dimension of warfare and form the essence of battle command: decisionmaking and leadership. Information-age technology sets several traps for operational decisionmakers. First is the notion that the age-old quest for certainty will soon be over; however, humans will still distort accurate and detailed

data as they try to turn it into worthwhile knowledge. The interaction of free-willed combatants will still be unpredictable, and although information technology may accelerate the collection and processing of data, commanders will still have to strike a balance between timeliness and accuracy of information in their decisions.⁴⁸ Judgment and intuition will still be important traits for commanders, a view reinforced by Army experiments and battle command training. Thus, "The Army is moving the nexus or balance of leadership and command away from a strict scientific application of knowledge toward a more creative, intuitive process which emphasizes the human dimension of battle."⁴⁹

Secondly, new technology tempts us to centralize decisionmaking. The Army is in the thick of this debate, unsure whether technological change will tend to enable the front-line soldiers or strip them of flexibility as complex information systems feed the better picture to higher headquarters far removed from the action. There is concern that the much-vaunted "digitization" of the battlefield will result in "emasculature of the subordinate commander,"⁵⁰ because, for perhaps the first time in history, the higher commander may have a better picture of what is going on than his subordinate on the scene.

Using information technology to empower subordinates matches our cultural bias toward the individual and is supported by business models and the combat record of armies that emphasized decentralized decisionmaking and freedom of action at subordinate levels.⁵¹ The demands of MOOTW and the confused, urban battlefields of the 21st century emphasized by the Marine Corps also favor decentralized decisionmaking. Here,

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General Krulak's "strategic corporal" can determine the success or failure of U.S. policy with one decision.

Just as the third-wave warrior may be radically different from traditional warrior models, 21st-century technology and warfighting methods challenge our traditional notions of leadership. But experimentation and operational practice reinforce the importance of personal leadership even as the increased dispersion of information-age battlefields makes it more difficult. In *Desert Storm*, perhaps best described as a transition war astride the industrial and information ages, ground force commanders specifically operated well forward so they could "get a feel for the battle and to increase their soldiers' morale and spirit during the fight."⁵² Likewise, experiments with information-systems technology and digital communications reveal that certain orders are best delivered via traditional means (voice or in person) in order to exchange clues about moral factors not decipherable from text on a computer screen.⁵³ As generations of Americans who grew up with computers and e-mail come into positions of power and information technology better captures human elements, these traditional methods of communication may further diminish in importance. But gauging the moral strength of the force, demonstrating a sense of shared danger and hardship, and reinforcing a warrior ethos will still require active personal leadership. While the complexity of warfighting in the information age will test all the capabilities of our operational commanders, effective leadership can help ensure that our will prevails.

The Enemy: A Contest of Wills

Our most critical mistake in regard to the human dimension of warfare is ignoring its role in the enemy's power equation. In 1979, Michael Howard noted the industrialized West's tendency to depend "on the technological dimension of strategy to the detriment of its operational requirements, while we ignore its societal implications altogether."⁵⁴ Information-age RMA has further amplified this dependency. Many of our warfighting concepts for the future, such as that outlined in *JV2010*, are so intertwined with the American way of war that they fail to recognize other, drastically different ideas about how to fight. Technology-based planning has replaced threat-based planning, particularly in MOOTW, where "our" model of warfighting does not fit the requirements of most situations.

America is prepared for traditional, conventional war, but 21st- century warfare may be significantly different. Increased military involvement with terrorists, drug lords, and centuries-old ethnic strife pits us against foes with varying means and significantly different value systems. Compared to the American way of war, revolutionary and terrorist organizations are perhaps the most different and most dangerous of all, for they follow no conventions on the use of force and are willing to use any means to achieve victory. These enemies will also seek to exploit the new capabilities of the RMA, including weapons of mass destruction (WMD), more effective and deadly terrorist capabilities, and cyberspace attacks of information warfare. MOOTW is also likely to take place on nontraditional battlegrounds, particularly within chaotic urban centers where combatants and noncombatants are intermixed and modern conventional weapons (tanks, airplanes) are ineffective.

While we tend to ignore the social dimensions of strategy, our potential foes study our will for ways to neutralize our technological advantage. For example, while we consider our respect for human life a strength, our enemies could consider it a vulnerability—Somali fighters used their own women and children as human shields, and in the Balkans the Serbs chained U.N. troops to potential targets.⁵⁵ These are “asymmetrical” responses of a different order that capitalize on cultural differences in a contest of wills.

The much-discussed likelihood of a coming “clash of civilizations,” as forecast by Samuel P. Huntington,⁵⁶ should also call us to carefully study the moral elements of potential enemies of different cultural backgrounds. A brief look at one potential threat from the Islamic world highlights the vulnerability of the American way of war and the dangers of an over-reliance on technology in warfighting. On the means side, Iran recognizes its inability to match the United States force-on-force with high-tech platforms focusing instead on asymmetrical counters to American strengths. For example, against an unmatched American naval capability, Iran would employ low-tech mines, diesel submarines, and numerous fast patrol craft. At the high-tech end, a sophisticated WMD and missile technology development program takes advantage of a current weakness in ballistic missile defense and threatens to exploit American aversion to casualties. Finally, state-sponsored terrorism is a power source that runs directly counter to American practice in both will and means.

A look at the Iran-Iraq War, the longest and bloodiest Third World conflict since 1945, offers a grim warning of the potential impact of Islam on the human dimension of warfare. Khomeini’s coupling of religious justification for the war with a sense of

national pride to create a “new Islamic Shia nationalism”⁵⁷ had direct and measurable effect in both mobilizing the population and motivating Iranian fighters to repel the Iraqi offensive. Aided by Iraq’s reluctance to commit its forces decisively, Iran was able to use highly motivated superior numbers in the early stages of the war to fulfill President Rasfanjani’s slogan, “The faith of the Islamic troops is stronger than Iraq’s superior firepower.”⁵⁸

The “Islamization” of the Iranian Armed Forces included the rise to prominence of the “Sepah,” the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, guerillas in the revolution who had been co-opted by Khomeini as he secured power. Mass mobilization in the cause was accomplished by re-establishing the “Basij,” the Mobilization of the Oppressed, a popular militia originally called to counter the expected American invasion following the fall of the Shah. The Basij came from the poorest classes of society, received only the barest training, and normally served a 3-month commitment to rear guard duty or, more likely, at the front. Initially relying on volunteers from all age groups—normally poor teenagers and the elderly—the regime had to turn to sterner recruitment measures and finally explicit drafts to fill the ranks of the militia as the war dragged on.

A few chilling examples of the extreme measures used by the Iranians highlight the potential for asymmetry between the American way of war and an Islamic foe. First is the use of so-called “human wave” tactics—using large numbers of lightly armed, highly motivated militia to attack Iraqi positions. First used in November 1981, the tactic was initially successful but hotly debated between the regular army and Sepah and largely abandoned after 1986, when the regime finally began to concede its waste of life. Secondly, the Iranians openly recruited children

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as warriors and glorified their sacrifice in Allah's cause. In 1982, Khomeini rescinded the requirement for parental permission for children to join the Basij. Sepah figures show 57 percent of the combat forces in the major Kheybar offensive of 1984 were school children—10,000 of whom were killed, wounded, or captured.⁵⁹ The combination of these tactics was horrific and effective, as well described by American military researchers seeking lessons from the war:

The Iranians first used the human wave attack on November 29, 1981, at Bostan. The brutality of the maneuver stunned the Iraqis. The Iranians herded hundreds of children (some no more than 12 years old) into the combat zone to detonate concealed mines. The children were followed by the Basij who threw themselves on the barbed wire, cutting through the entanglements under fire of the Iraqis. Finally came the Pasdaran [the Sepah] who attacked over the corpses of the slain Basij. Initially the human waves encountered units of Iraq's Popular Army. These were militia, not regular troops, and they broke and fled under the assault.⁶⁰

While Islamic nationalism was decisive in halting the initial Iraqi offensives and gaining the initiative, the superior numbers so highly charged with the zeal of Islam deserted the theocracy as the war dragged on. By 1988, Iran could not muster enough motivated soldiers (of any age) to even mount an offensive, much less win the war.⁶¹ But the measures they were willing to use should remind us that "our" way of fighting is not the only one.

A careful study of the moral elements of potential enemies from very different cultural backgrounds is essential to success in 21st-century warfare. The 8-year Iran-Iraq war, complete with chemical attacks and estimates of over one million dead demonstrates that our potential enemies do not share our predisposition towards peace and minimum loss of life.⁶²

Human waves, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, or other methods all offer ways to defeat the vain superpower who relies on superior forces and technological prowess instead of appropriate forces and mental agility. Further, in the contest of wills that is combat, understanding what animates and motivates the people involved—civilian leaders, military commanders, individual soldiers, and the populace supporting them—is central to understanding and accounting for the human dimension of warfare.

Conclusion

Because the means of war are in a period of revolutionary change, we must focus on incorporating information-age technology into our practice of the art of war and exploit the opportunities it offers. But technology will not solve the eternal problems of war, for “war is a matter of heart and will first; weaponry and technology second.”⁶³ The real key is the relationship of *means* and *will*, as the latest “revolution in military affairs” challenges yet again the role of the human dimension of warfare. Operational art is much more than just applying force against force. The best operational commanders can see and feel the moral factors at work—on both sides. By understanding and employing *will* and *means*, they maximize their combat power, foster cohesion among their forces, and achieve the aim of battle—the disintegration of the enemy.

Notes

1. Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 1995), V-1.
2. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, eds. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 77.
3. John Keegan, *The Face of Battle* (New York: Vintage, 1977), 298.

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4. Clausewitz, 184.

5. See, for example, the section on "The Fundamental Nature of War" in U.S. Air Force, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, AFDD1 (Washington: September 1997), 6, "The Human Dimension," in *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), 14-1.

6. Helmuth von Moltke, *Moltke on the Art of War*, ed. Daniel J. Hughes, trans. Harry Bell and Daniel J. Hughes (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993). 172. I was led to this quote by Brian Reinwald's article, note 33.

7. The quest for regulating principles and an exact science of war has been an on-again, off-again affair as scientific advances in other fields have promised more accurate modeling and prediction for warfare. For the history of this endeavor, see for example John Shy's survey of the "Jominian line" in John Shy, "Jomini," in *Makers of Modern Strategy*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), especially 183-184. The inaccuracy of our most sophisticated models, for instance, in predicting *Desert Storm* casualties, highlights the difficulty of accounting for "will" and the human dimension. I return to the possibilities of war as science below in regard to the "new sciences."

8. The "powershift" to a third-wave world is described in Alvin Toffler, *Powershift* (New York: Bantam, 1990) and placed into military context in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993).

9. See, for example, James R. Fitzimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 4 (Spring 1994): 24-31.

10. David C. Gompert, "National Security in the Information Age," *Naval War College Review* 51, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 30.

11. My summary of the "American RMA" is drawn from Paul K. Van Riper and F. G. Hoffman, "Pursuing the Real Revolution in Military Affairs: Exploiting Knowledge-Based Warfare," *National Security Studies Quarterly* 4, no. 19 (Summer 1998): 2-3. The "father" of the "system of systems" model is former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff William Owens; see William Owens, "The Emerging System of Systems," *Military Review* 75, no. 3 (May-June 1995): 15-19.

12. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, "Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," *Proceedings* 124, no. 1 (January 1998): 29.

13. Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, 74.

14. Cebrowski and Garstka, 35.
15. Van Riper and Hoffman, 3.
16. FM 100-5, 1-2.
17. Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). The culture framework used here draws on Builder, the specifics are mine. Builder does not address USMC culture, but I have used his measures/metaphors(e.g., "altar") in my analysis. The concepts discussed below (strategic attack, network-centric warfare, the three-block war) are not intended to be all encompassing or to match specific service doctrine. Rather, they offer a representative sample of views on the role of moral versus physical factors, colored by service cultures and roles.
18. John A. Warden III, quoted in Karen S. Wilhelm, "The USAF and Technological Assymetry: A Critique of Current Air Power Theory and Doctrine, unpublished monograph (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1995), 24. For a review of the lineage from Douhet to Trenchard to Mitchell to Warden, see David R. Mets, *The Air Campaign: John Warden and the Classical Airpower Theorists* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1998).
19. Warden was a key player in re-starting this debate with his theory of concentric rings, delineated in John A. Warden III, "The Enemy As a System," *Airpower Journal* 79, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 41-55. A recent attempt at revising strategic attack theory representative of the targeting debate is Edward J. Felker, "Airpower, Chaos, and Infrastructure: Lords of the Rings," *Essays 1998* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1998), 55-88.
20. *Air Force Basic Doctrine* (AFDD-1), 41.
21. Cebrowski and Garstka, 33-34.
22. Wilhelm, 43. For the standard Air Force argument of the inherent strength of technological superiority see, for example, Ronald R. Fogleman, "Air Power and Asymmetric Force Strategy," *Air Power History* 43, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 5-13.
23. Cebrowski and Garstka, 34.
24. T. X. Hammes, "War Isn't A Rational Business," *Proceedings* 124, no. 7 (July 1998): 24. Hammes notes that the Somalis defeated our "sensor grid" and in fact achieved information superiority by using local tribal communications architectures.

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25. Eliot A. Cohen, "The Mystique of U.S. Air Power," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (January-February 1994): 122. Cohen asserts that to be decisive air power must directly target enemy leadership or be used with devastating lethality against civil society (strategic bombing revisited).
26. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Gazette* 83, no. 1 (January 1999): 18-22.
27. "Building a Corps for the 21st Century," *Concepts & Issues* 98 (Washington: U.S. Marine Corps, 1998), 38.
28. Builder, 133.
29. Ibid., 185.
30. *One Team, One Fight, One Future* (Washington: Department of the Army, n.d.), 21.
31. Paul J. Hooper, "Army Modernization: Preparing Today for Tomorrow," *Army* 48, no. 10 (October 1998): 33.
32. Robert E. Hall, "Focus on Fundamentals of Soldiering In These Tough, Turbulent Times," *Army* 48, no. 10 (October 1998): 27-30.
33. David J. Lemelin, "Force XXI: Getting it Right," *Military Review* 76, no. 6 (November-December 1996). Lemelin offered leadership, training, and cohesion as the factors that should be focused on in peacetime. His article is representative of the call to an emphasis on the human dimension. See also Brian R. Reinwald, "Retaining the Moral Element of War," *Military Review* 78, no. 1 (January-February 1998): 69-76, which makes a compelling case that technology will not alter the nature of war.
34. Regarding the Army's principal role in dominant maneuver see Dennis J. Reimer, "Dominant Maneuver and Precision Engagement," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996-97): 13-16.
35. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), is the classic text tracing the development of the American way of war. It has been updated by others such as Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "Preliminary Observations: Asymmetrical Warfare and the Western Mindset," in *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1998), 1-17.
36. Joint Publication 3-0, I-2.
37. Henry H. Shelton, "Operationalizing *Joint Vision 2010*," *Military Review* 78, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 81.
38. *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 34.

39. Stephen J. Blank, "How We Will Lose the Next War With Russia: A Critique of U.S. Military Strategy," in *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically: Can America Be Defeated?*, 257.

40. Ralph Peters, "The New Strategic Trinity," *Parameters* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1998-99): 73-79.

41. *Joint Vision 2010*, 25.

42. *National Military Strategy* (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997). The mismatch between *JV2010* operational concepts and expected missions is a principal critique of Jon A. Kimminau, "Joint Vision 2010: Hale or Hollow?" *Proceedings* 123, no. 9 (September 1997): 79. Kimminau considers *JV2010* as particularly irrelevant to MOOTW and says our focus on major war impacts readiness and willingness for other military roles.

43. Carl H. Builder, "Keeping The Strategic Flame Alive," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 14 (Winter 1996-97): 77.

44. See, for example, John S. Richard, "The Learning Army: Approaching the 21st Century as a Learning Organization," unpublished research project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1997.

45. Hammes, 22.

46. This basic distinction is made by Thomas P. M. Barnett, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare," *Proceedings* 125, no. 1 (January 1999): 39, where he describes "coveting the business world's self-synchronization" as network-centric warfare's sin of envy.

47. This is the so-called "butterfly theory," related by Hammes, 23, among others. In a complex system a minor input (a butterfly flaps its wings) can produce a major change in output (unseasonal weather somewhere else).

48. Martin van Creveld, *Command In War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 266.

49. Jack Gumbert, "Leadership in the Digitized Force," *Military Review* 78, no. 1 (January-February 1998): 17.

50. Robert L. Bateman, "Force XXI and the Death of Auftragstaktik," *Armor* 105, no. 1 (January-February 1996): 14.

51. Van Creveld, 270, makes the historical case. See also Douglas A. Macgregor, "Initiative in Battle: Past and Future," *Marine Corps Gazette* 81, no. 8 (August 1997): 62-67. Macgregor draws on van Creveld and others and notes how information age technology can stifle initiative.

52. Paul E. Blackwell and Gregory J. Bozek, "Leadership for the New Millenium," *Military Review* 78, no. 3 (May-June 1998): 45.

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53. Gumbert, 19-20.
54. Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 57, no. 5 (Summer 1979): 986.
55. Dunlap, 7.
56. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Touchstone, 1996). Huntington traces the collapse of the nation-state system and forecasts increasing conflict, particularly along the fault lines of a civilization based structure.
57. Sepehr Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War* (London: Routledge, 1988), 17.
58. Rasfanjani, 1984, as quoted in Shahram Chubin, "Iran and the War: From Stalemate to Ceasefire," in *The Iran-Iraq War*, ed. Efraim Karsh (New York: St. Martin's Press 1989), 15.
59. Zabih, 220.
60. Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Lessons Learned: The Iran-Iraq War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1991), 10.
61. Chubin, 23.
62. Casualty estimates from Pelletiere and Johnson, 116. Regarding the "American myth of peace" see Ralph Peters, "Our New Old Enemies," in *Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically*, 232-235.
63. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, *Land Warfare in the 21st Century* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993), 27.

The 18th Annual Competition

On May 20 and 21, 1999, NDU convened a panel of judges at Fort Lesley J. McNair in Washington, DC, to evaluate the entries in the CJCS Strategy Essay Competition. The 1999 judges were:

Ambassador Jane E. Becker, Industrial College
of the Armed Forces

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Charles C. Chadbourn III, Naval War College

Colonel Paul Herbert, USA, National War College

John C. Hodell, Naval War College

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James A. Mowbray, Air War College

Patricia S. Pond, U.S. Army War College

Joe Strange, Marine Corps War College

On June 14, 1999, Lieutenant General Richard A. Chilcoat, USA, the President of the National Defense University, presented the awards on behalf of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the contest winners whose essays appear in this volume.

The 1999 competition was administered by Robert A. Silano, Director of Publications and Editor of *Joint Force Quarterly*, in the Institute for National Strategic Studies, with the assistance of William R. Bode, George C. Maerz, Mary A. Sommerville, and Jonathan W. Pierce of NDU Press.

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